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Chapter 1
Health Insurance Take-Up Among the Near-Elderly in the Age of the Affordable Care Act
1.1 Introduction
Policies aimed at expanding insurance coverage can have very different effects on different
groups. For example near-elderly individuals’ proximity in age to Medicare eligibility further the
effects of programs that increase health insurance coverage. Those receiving generous benefits may
be able to seek treatment immediately; those with less generous or no coverage have an incentive to
forgo elective or preventive care until they are eligible for Medicare.
Because the near-elderly transition into near-universal health coverage at age 65, it is crucial
to understand how programs intended to increase coverage prior to this transition will affect this
population. If individuals are already covered, the policy to increase insurance coverage will have
little effect. However, if individuals are obtaining insurance coverage prior to reaching the Medi-
care eligibility age, the new insurance coverage may help them gain treatment for conditions earlier,
reducing the potential for sharp health care demand increases upon entering Medicare and possibly
improving their health. Finally, the structure and generosity of insurance plans obtained through ex-
pansion efforts compared to Medicare generosity may determine whether newly insured individuals
seek care in the near term or wait until enrolling in Medicare.
The ambiguity of effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) on the near-elderly population and
threats to repeal the law motivate for this paper. While the ACA reduced the uninsurance rate
by half among all non-elderly adults (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017), we know
little about the law’s effect on the near-elderly. Changes in health care access and health insurance
among this group are particularly important to understand, as this group consumes more medical
services than their younger counterparts. Further, health care coverage of the near-elderly may
impact consumption and spending once these individuals enter Medicare.
In this paper, I estimate the effect of the ACA on insurance coverage of the near-elderly transi-
tioning into Medicare. I specifically study the short-term change in insurance rates of near-elderly
individuals before and after the implementation of the ACA. I utilize the exogenous transition into
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Medicare at age 65 to evaluate whether the ACA reduced the gap in continuous insurance cov-
erage of newest Medicare beneficiaries. I use a Difference-in-Regression Discontinuity (RD-DD)
research design with data from the American Community Survey (ACS), Behavioral Risk Factor
Surveillance Survey (BRFSS), and National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) to estimate the change
in the insurance rate at the age 65 threshold (i.e. the RD) before and after the ACA (i.e the DD).
Before 2014, insurance coverage jumps by 7.97 percentage points at age 65 (90.1% to 98%):
after the ACA the difference falls by 3.4 (p<0.001) percentage points. Sixty percent of the insurance
gains in Medicaid expansion states come from Medicaid, while 86 percent of gains in non-expansion
states come from private insurance policies. Further, I find that the ACA narrowed but did not
close insurance coverage disparities between races. The insurance rates both before and after the
cutoff are higher for whites than blacks; for whites, insurance rates jumped from 91.4% to 98.7%
at the cutoff, while insurance rates for blacks jumped from 87.7% to 96.2%. Though the point
estimates are similar for non-Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic blacks (2.99 and 2.61 percentage
points, respectively), the relative effect of the ACA is larger for whites (40%) than blacks (30%).The
relative effect of the ACA on other races is the largest; of the 12.9 percentage point jump in insurance
coverage (from 81.3% to 94.1%) at the cutoff, two-thirds of that is due to the coverage provisions
of the ACA.
Despite extending health care coverage for 20 million Americans, efforts to repeal and replace
the ACA have moved forward several times in 2017. Each bill proposed would have entailed large
reductions in the insurance rate; the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated up to 14 million
individuals would be without insurance by the end of 2018 in scoring the American Health Care
Act (AHCA).1 The near-elderly population, those between the ages of 55 and 64, who obtained
insurance under the ACA were expected to be affected disproportionately by its repeal; passage
of the AHCA could result in premiums increasing up to five times higher than those of younger
adults, while tax credits would only be twice as large (Congressional Budget Office, 2017, p. 2).
Additionally, proposed Medicaid block grants that diminish in real terms over time, where states
receive lump sums to administer Medicaid, would effectively halt and eventually reverse Medicaid
expansions.
1CBO scores for other bills (Graham-Cassidy and Better Care Reconciliation Act) produced similar estimates of the
number of uninsured individuals resulting from ACA repeal.
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The order of the paper is as follows. In the next section, I describe the institutional setup
pertinent to this population and the mechanisms through which obtaining health insurance prior to
age 65 would affect use patterns in Medicare. I review the sample selection and research design for
this study in Section 1.3, and discuss results and robustness checks in Section 1.4. Finally, I close
with policy implications and future steps in Section 1.5.
1.2 Institutional Setup and Literature Review
Prior to the Affordable Care Act, 81.5 percent of those aged 18 to 64 were covered by some
source of health insurance compared to 87.6 percent of 60- to 64-year olds (United States Census
Bureau, 2016).2 In 2013, 52.5% of the near-elderly population obtained coverage via employer-
sponsored insurance (ESI) plans. Disabled low-income individuals and low-income adults with
dependent children may have been eligible for public insurance under Medicare or Medicaid, though
state-level eligibility depended on income and disability qualifications. Seventeen states offered
basic health insurance plans for low-income childless adults, although plan options, eligibility, and
availability were by no means universal across states.3 About 3 percent of near-elderly individuals
obtained health insurance through other programs sponsored by the federal government, such as
TRICARE or the Indian Health Service. Finally, those who did not qualify for any of the former
options could have purchased individual insurance plans directly from companies; nearly 10% of
the near-elderly obtained coverage this way.
For the near-elderly, whose medical use and costs are generally higher than the rest of the
non-elderly population, the effects of being uninsured or underinsured are clear. Those who lack
health insurance use fewer medical services, often leading to undiagnosed, untreated, or unmanaged
chronic conditions (Wilper et al., 2009; McWilliams et al., 2004; Kaufman et al., 2015). These
effects are more pronounced in the near-elderly, who generally have a higher prevalence of chronic
conditions such as hypertension and diabetes.
Once reaching Medicare eligibility age, previously underinsured and underinsured people tend
to utilize Medicare services at a higher rate than new enrollees who were previously adequately
insured, particularly if they have been uninsured for a long period of time (Card et al., 2008;
2See (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017) for the most recent statistics on non-elderly uninsurance rates.
3A full list of states providing basic health plans prior to 2014 can be found in Simon et al. (2017).
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McWilliams et al., 2007) McWilliams et al. (2009) linked administrative claims data with the Health
and Retirement Study to investigate utilization before and after individuals enroll in Medicare. The
authors found previously uninsured individuals had higher hospitalization rates for lower extremity
joint replacement and complications related to certain chronic conditions. Decker et al. (2012) also
linked administrative data with the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and Health and Re-
tirement Study (HRS) but did not find the same increases in hospitalizations. However, the authors
did find previously uninsured people had more emergency department and outpatient hospital visits
and fewer office-based physician visits.
Most relevant to this topic is a study by Card et al. (2008), which used the NHIS and inpatient
discharge data to analyze coverage and utilization of near-elderly individuals near the Medicare
eligibility threshold. Using a regression discontinuity based on the Medicare age cutoff, they found
a 9.5 percentage point increase in health insurance coverage, sharp increases in use of low cost health
services, and modest increases in elective surgeries. Subgroups who been uninsured or underinsured
showed the largest increases in utilization, suggesting that pre-Medicare insurance coverage affects
post-Medicare consumption.
The ACA included three kinds of policies meant to increase health insurance among non-elderly
individuals who previously were unable to afford it. The first effort to expand insurance coverage
came via several changes to employer sponsored insurance between 2010 and 2016. In 2010, em-
ployers received funding to cover insurance for near-elderly individuals in the case of retirement
prior to age 65. Between 2014 and 2016, small firms began offering insurance to their employees;
employer mandates went into effect for firms with at least 50 employees (2015), then firms with
at least 100 employees (2016). The government offered tax credits aimed at assisting small firms,
those with less than 25 employees, obtain health insurance coverage. The credit incentives, first
offered in 2010, increased in 2014 for firms purchasing insurance via the state insurance exchanges
(French et al., 2010).
Second, the ACA established health insurance marketplaces, where the uninsured could pur-
chase community-rated and potentially subsidized private health insurance plans. In states that
expanded Medicaid, those obtaining insurance via the exchanges qualify for premium tax credits if
their income is between 138 and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level. In states that did not expand
Medicaid, premium tax credits are available for people with incomes between 100 and 400% of
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the federal poverty level. These two coverage options had the potential to benefit the near elderly
population substantially; half the uninsured individuals between ages 60 and 64 stated high cost as
a reason for lacking health insurance (National Center for Health Statistics, 2016).
Third, the ACA allowed states to expand Medicaid to low-income childless adults. Prior to the
ACA, low-income people who were childless had few options to obtain affordable coverage. The
ACA offered incentives to states to expand Medicaid eligibility and offer low- to no-cost state-run
public insurance to single childless adults earning below 139% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).4
To date, thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have implemented the ACA’s Medicaid ex-
pansion.
Numerous studies have detailed the effects of Medicaid expansions on health insurance coverage
for the low-income non-elderly population. A few, such as Sommers et al. (2014), estimated the
effect of the Medicaid expansion on uninsurance rates in states that opted to expand prior to full
ACA roll-out in 2014. The authors found modest (between 3.7 and 4.9 percentage point) increases
in health insurance coverage in these states. Others analyzed the effects following the full Medicaid
expansion rollout. Simon et al. (2017), using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
Survey, found an increase of 5.4 percentage points in health insurance coverage after the first 2
years of the Medicaid expansion; this was between the 7.4 percentage points reported by Wherry
& Miller (2016) using the National Health Interview Survey and 2.9 percentage points reported by
Courtemanche C, Marton J, Ukert B, Yelowitz A, Zapata D. (2017) using American Community
Survey data. Others (Barbaresco et al., 2015; Long et al., 2017; Sommers et al., 2017) reported
similar estimates.
Few have given attention to the near-elderly population. At most, there is a mention of increased
insurance rates among those ages 55 to 64 (Long et al., 2017). However, there is no study, to my
knowledge, that evaluates coverage rates in the near-elderly population and whether these changes
bring near-elderly insurance rates to parity with Medicare coverage rates. This particular population
is important for a few reasons. As previously mentioned, the near-elderly are more likely to have
chronic conditions and higher demand for medical care; this group gaining health insurance prior to
4Initially, the federal government mandated state expansions of Medicaid. However, the Supreme Court, in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius ruled against the mandate and granted states the option to refuse expan-
sion. See Rosenbaum & Westmoreland (2012) for implications of this decision on Medicaid and the flexibility of enacting
the ACA.
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entering age 65 may alleviate the pent-up demand that occurs after initial Medicare enrollment. The
newly insured individuals may manage chronic conditions at earlier stages, potentially offsetting
future costly medical procedures. The benefits of these coverage provisions may provide substantial
savings for the 45% of uninsured near-elderly individuals who have been so for longer than three
years (National Center for Health Statistics, 2016). This paper fills this gap by studying how the
ACA affected the coverage transition to Medicare.
1.3 Data and Estimation Strategy
1.3.1 Data
To measure the changes in insurance rates among the near-elderly and elderly, I use the 2009-
2016 waves of data from three sources: American Community Survey (ACS), Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS), and National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). I restrict each
sample to individuals between 60 and 70 years old, resulting in 3.1 million observations from ACS,
636,000 observations in BRFSS, and 75,000 observations in NHIS.
The American Community Survey is the most comprehensive source for this study, as it pro-
vides state-level identifiers and detailed information on respondents’ insurance types. Of interest
to this study is the question asking: “Is this person currently covered by any of the following types
of health insurance or health coverage plans?” Respondents may identify more than one type of in-
surance coverage from the following choices:employer or union, direct purchase from an insurance
company, Medicare, Medicaid, Veterans Administration, TRICARE, and Indian Health Service.
Second, I use the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey. For this study, I focus on the
question “Do you have any kind of health care coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans
such as HMOs, government plans such as Medicare, or Indian Health Service?” The respondent is
given a binary choice, unless they refuse to answer or do not know.
Finally, I use the National Health Interview Survey, which unfortunately does not provide state
identifiers, to verify my results and maintain consistency with other studies. I focus on the set of
questions in the family health insurance module. I measure any health insurance coverage from
the question “Are you covered by an kind of health insurance or some other kind of health plan?”
and specific types of insurance with the follow-up question “What kind of health insurance do
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you have?” The options offered to the respondent are: Private Health Insurance, Medicare, Medi-
gap, SCHIP, Military Health Coverage (TRICARE, VA, CHAMPUS), Indian Health Service, State
Sponsored Plan, Other Government Plan, and Single Service Plan.
Descriptive statistics for data associated with each of these sources can be found in Table 1.1.
Prior to the Affordable Care Act, the insurance rate among 60-64 year olds ranged from 87.4% (in
BRFSS) to 88.3% (in NHIS), compared to an average of 98.4% among 65-70 year olds, as shown
in Table 1.1. After the ACA, the insurance rate for the elderly remained steady, but for the near-
elderly, there was a substantial increase in insurance rates to 91.7% due to the ACA. Just over half
the observations are female, and the fraction of females increases after age 65. Approximately 2
of every 3 individuals in each sample are married both before and after age 65. Because of the
conflicting definitions of employment in each survey, the fraction of individuals employed varies
by data source; however, the decline in employment before compared to after age 65 is consistent
across all samples. Across all surveys, approximately 11.7% to 15.7% of respondents had left
school prior to obtaining a diploma, while 25% to 29% obtained a high school diploma or GED. On
average, 30% to 32% have completed postsecondary education or continued to obtain higher level
degrees.
1.3.2 Research Design
To estimate the change in insurance coverage due to the ACA at age 65, I use a Difference-
in-Regression-Discontinuity (DiRD or DD-RD) design. I compare the difference in insurance for
near-elderly individuals prior to ACA implementation to the elderly who are enrolled in Medicare
after ACA implementation. I first estimate the difference in insurance rates at the threshold just
prior to individuals becoming eligible for Medicare at age 65. Second, I estimate the magnitude of
the change in the insurance rate among near-elderly adults.
First, I replicate the Card et al. (2008) regression discontinuity design, utilizing the change in
Medicare eligibility that occurs among nearly every US citizen at age 65. The main outcome of
interest, Yit , is insurance rate. For individual i in time t, outcome Yit is modeled as:
Yit = α0 +α1(PostAge65i)+α2 f (Ageit)+X ′itα3 + γt + εit (1.1)
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In this equation, PostAge65 is an indicator that equals one if the individual is age 65 or older.
The coefficient α1 measures the magnitude of the abrupt discontinuity of the probability of being
insured upon reaching age 65.
The second difference is based on the date of implementation for the two relevant pieces of the
law–Medicaid expansion and creation of the exchanges. Most states that expanded Medicaid did
so in January 2014; it should follow that outcomes would be most strongly affected in 2014-2016
compared to 2009-2013. The same applies to insurance obtained through the exchanges, which
became active in January 2014. I combine the Regression Discontinuity in Equation 1.1 with a
differences-in-differences model to measure the effect of the ACA on the disparity in insurance
rates at the age 65 discontinuity. This is estimated by:
Yit = β0 +β1(PostAge65i ∗PostACAt)+β2 f (Ageit)+X ′itβ3 +δt + εit (1.2)
In Equation (1.2), PostACA is an indicator that equals one in 2014 and after. The coefficient
β1, is an estimate of change in insurance rates at the age 65 threshold between pre- and post-ACA
periods. I also include a set of controls, including indicators for marital status, sex, education level,
race, and employment status in this regression. Finally, I include a linear function of an individual’s
age as well as time fixed effects and cluster by age.
1.4 Results
For consistency and clarity, I discuss only the results from the American Community Survey.
Estimates from BRFSS and NHIS, shown in Appendix A, are consistent with these results.
1.4.1 Full Sample
Figure 1.1 highlights the usefulness of an RD-DD framework to estimate the effect of the ACA
on insurance rates for the near-elderly as they approach Medicare age. This figure shows the prob-
ability of being insured for individuals between age 60 and 70 both before and after the ACA.
Insurance rates for those aged 65 to 70 do not change over time. Insurance rates for the near-elderly,
however, change substantially. Prior to the ACA, the difference in the insurance rate at the threshold
was 9 percentage points on a base of 88.7%. After the ACA, the difference at the cutoff decreases
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to 5.9 percentage points. Figure 1.2 plots the year-by-year discontinuity in insurance rates at the
Medicare eligibility threshold. (Of note is the slight decrease in the uninsurance rate in 2013. This
early effect can be attributed to a combination of early expansions in some states and the “wood-
work” effect, where previously eligible individuals take up Medicaid due to increased publicity and
the threat of penalties.) In the first year of widespread ACA implementation, the disparity in insur-
ance rates at the age 65 threshold dropped 1.2 percentage points (p<0.001) from 8.1% to 6.9%.5
The change in insurance coverage in the second year of implementation was slightly smaller (0.9
percentage points), but there was another substantial drop in 2016 of 1.45 percentage points. In
total, the gap in insurance rates at the threshold was reduced by 44% due to newly enacted ACA
coverage provisions.
Several other pieces of evidence suggest that these changes in the age 65 discontinuity are
due to the ACA. Since policies associated with the Affordable Care Act were aimed at expanding
Medicaid and providing an avenue for individuals to purchase private insurance, it is reasonable
to expect changes only in these two types of insurance. Figure 1.3 graphs the RD estimates of
the change in the probability of having Medicaid as the sole source of insurance at age 65. Prior to
2014, only 4.4% of 63- and 64- year-olds were insured by Medicaid alone. Medicaid expansion after
the first year resulted in an increase of 2.3 percentage points, followed by another 1.2 percentage
point increase in 2015 and 2016. Combined, the average effect of Medicaid expansion resulted in
a decrease in the insurance rate gap at the age 65 threshold by 3.5 percentage points. I find similar
effects on private insurance coverage, shown in Figure 1.3. Prior to the ACA, approximately 10%
of the near-elderly population purchased insurance directly. Marketplaces were open to the public
in the final months of 2013 for coverage in 2014. In the first year of marketplace offerings, the the
fraction of individuals gaining coverage via the private market insurance rate changed by less than
one percentage point. Coverage via the marketplace further reduced the gap in insurance coverage
at the cutoff by 1.4 percentage points in 2015 and 1 percentage point in 2016.
I further show the changes in other types of insurance and, by extension, changes in the dis-
continuity at age 65, as individuals become eligible to enroll in Medicare are negligible after the
ACA became law. Columns 1, 4, and 7 in Table 1.2 display the difference in magnitude at the cutoff
5RD estimates may be biased toward zero in 2014 as the open enrollment period extended through March 31, 2014 or
beyond for some. See Claxton et al. (2014) for more details.
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for Medicare, Employer Sponsored Insurance (ESI), and any combination of two or more types of
insurance. In order for the changes in the magnitude of the discontinuity to be due to the ACA,
the year-on-year estimates must remain constant for Medicare and those who have insurance from
two or more sources. Among the full sample, there were no statistically significant changes in the
discontinuity gap at the age 65 cutoff for those enrolled in Medicare, ESI, or two or more sources
of insurance.
1.4.2 Low Income Earning <139% FPL
Before the ACA, the gap in insurance coverage at the cutoff is twice as large in individuals earn-
ing less than 139% of the FPL compared to the overall population: reaching Medicare eligibility age
increases insurance coverage 14 percentage points relative to a base of 78.5%. The ACA specifi-
cally targeted this group, and reduced the uninsurance rate among low-income 63- and 64-year-olds
by 6.3 percentage points, closing the gap at the threshold by 45%.
Figure 1.3 plots the magnitude of the discontinuity by year for low-income Medicaid enrollees.
Expansion of Medicaid for low-income childless adults resulted in immediate changes for this
group; after a slight increase in the gap at the cutoff in 2013, the difference in insurance cover-
age at age 65 reached a new low in 2014 and continued to decline in 2015 and 2016. Overall, the
ACA, through Medicaid expansions and increased take-up of previously eligible individuals in all
states, reduced the insurance coverage gap at the cutoff by 7 percentage points.
Point estimates by year are charted for the change in private insurance coverage are shown in
Figure 1.3. Overall, the ACA increased private insurance rates among the low-income near-elderly;
this is due to take-up of private insurance by those earning between 100% and 138% of the FPL and
living in states that did not expand Medicaid. There was no effect of the ACA on private market
coverage for those earning less than 100% of the FPL.6
Columns 2 and 8 of Table 1.2 show there is no change in the discontinuity upon reaching age 65
in the fraction of individuals with Medicare and two or more types of insurance coverage. However,
the probability of having Employer Sponsored Insurance while earning <139% of the FPL drops by
2.3 percentage points after the ACA, as shown in column 2. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis
6See supplemental Table A1 in Appendix C
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that only insurance coverage rates of Medicaid and private insurance change while other types
remain constant. Rather, it suggests a potential crowd-out effect for this low-income population;
becoming eligible for a health insurance option with low- to no-cost sharing drives employed, low-
income individuals away from (potentially expensive) Employer Sponsored Insurance to Medicaid.
This is consistent with the results reported by Kaestner et al. (2015), but at odds with the analysis
of Frean et al. (2017).
1.4.3 Low Income, Earning Between 139% and 400% FPL
Prior to the ACA, the insurance coverage rate for 63- and 64-year-olds earning between 139%
and 400% of the FPL was 87.2%, about 8.5 percentage points higher than the rate for individuals
earning less than 139% of the FPL. Making health insurance marketplaces available to this group
reduces the uninsurance rate by 4.45 percentage points.
Figure 1.3 plots the year over year estimates of the change in the probability of those who earn
139-400% of the FPL having private insurance at the discontinuity. This figure shows the change
in insurance prevalence among those aged 63 and 64 by year. Figure 1.3 plots the same for Medi-
caid. Although Medicaid expansion did not direct apply to this group, there were still statistically
significant increases in the fraction of 63 and 64-year-olds insured; the ACA increased Medicaid
insurance coverage for this group by 2.64 percentage points. These increases are explained by take-
up in state-sponsored plans that offered basic health insurance for individuals earning up to 200%
FPL.
1.4.4 Stratification by Education Level and Ethnicity
1.4.4.1 Any Insurance
The first row of each category in Table 1.3 shows the mean insurance rate of 63- and 64-year-
olds and estimated jump in insurance rates at the cutoff. The second row shows the change in the
magnitude of the discontinuity that is due to the ACA. Overall, insurance coverage upon reaching
age 65 increases by 7.97 percentage points on a base of 90.1%. Prior to the ACA, 88.5% of 63
and 64 year olds had some type of health insurance. Upon reaching age 65, this increases by 10
percentage points. There is no effect on insurance rates for the elderly due to the ACA; before
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2014, 98.2% of 65- to 67-year-olds were insured, whereas 98.5% of this group was insured after
2014. The change in the prevalence of insurance, 3.44 percentage points, is due to ACA coverage
provisions. This is graphically shown in Figure 1.1 referenced earlier.
1.4.4.2 By Ethnicity
Medicare is often touted as equalizing racial and socioeconomic disparities in health insurance
and health care access (Card et al., 2008). Prior research suggests the ACA may not have the
same effect; Shane & Ayyagari (2014) found that the dependent coverage mandate increased insur-
ance rates for all groups, but did not reduce disparities among low-income populations. Estimates
presented in Table 1.3 reinforce those results. The prevalence of any health insurance among near-
elderly Non-Hispanic whites is higher than the national average in these data, driven by high rates
of private and employer sponsored insurance; reaching Medicare-eligibility age adds 7.3 percentage
points to a base of 91.4%. Non-Hispanic blacks have a lower prevalence of any kind of insurance
prior to reaching age 65. However, reaching Medicare eligibility age increases the prevalence of
health insurance by 8.49 percentage points.
The effect of the ACA on insurance coverage also varies both in the magnitude and the mech-
anism through which insurance is obtained. The ACA closed the insurance coverage gap by 2.9
percentage points in whites and 2.61 percentage points in blacks. This alone is notable in that prior
to the ACA, insurance rates among 63- and 64-year-old whites were 4 percentage points higher than
those of blacks; one would expect more substantial changes in the group with lower initial rates of
insurance coverage. The difference is even larger among other races; the ACA reduced the insur-
ance coverage gap by 8.69 percentage points at the cutoff, but their initial insurance coverage is 10
percentage points lower than that of whites. The difference in the source of newly obtained insur-
ance coverage is notable, as shown in Table 1.3. Specifically, take-up of private health insurance
after the ACA among blacks and whites is similar (2.5 and 3.11 percentage points, respectively),
but Medicaid enrollment among blacks after the ACA is nearly three times that of whites (3.6 and
1.38 percentage points, respectively) on a base mean that is already 2.5 times that of whites (10.5%
vs 4.08%).
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1.4.4.3 By Education Status and Ethnicity
The changes in insurance rates upon reaching Medicare eligibility are mixed when stratifying
by education status (not shown). It is expected those with the lowest levels of education would
benefit more from new coverage provisions compared to those with a college degree. However,
what is surprising is the difference when stratifying by race and education level. Reaching Medicare
enrollment age increases the likelihood of blacks who did not complete high school having insurance
coverage by 12.4 percentage points, while the effect is only 3.64 percentage points for their white
high educated counterparts. Combined with a substantial 15 percentage point difference in insurance
rates prior to Medicare eligibility, reaching age 65 closes the gap between these two subgroups by
10 percentage points. This is demonstrated graphically in Figure 1.3.
Coverage provisions provided through the ACA closed the gap in insurance prevalence at age
65 by 4.58 percentage points for low educated blacks, while the effect was less than 1 percentage
point for high educated whites. This is not surprising; high educated whites were three times more
likely than low educated blacks to have employer-sponsored coverage, which was subject to few
substantial changes under the ACA.
1.4.5 Medicaid Expansion vs Health Insurance Exchanges
Sources of new insurance coverage varied based on whether or not a state expanded Medicaid
to low-income individuals. Figure 1.4 shows the private market and Medicaid insurance rates for
expansion and non-expansion states before and after the ACA. In states that did not expand Med-
icaid, the fraction of individuals with Medicaid coverage increased slightly after the ACA, but the
prevalence of private coverage increased significantly. For Medicaid expansion states, there was an
increase in private coverage and substantial increase in Medicaid recipients.
Table 1.4 contains point estimates reflecting the change in Medicaid and private insurance (out-
comes are mutually exclusive) for individuals aged 63 or 64 just prior to transitioning into Medicare.
Columns 1 through 3 show how the ACA affected insurance coverage through Medicaid in states
that expanded the program compared to those that did not expand Medicaid. Prior to expansion,
around 3.4% percent of individuals were insured through Medicaid in non-expansion states, lower
than the five percent in expansion states. After the implementation of the ACA, there was 0.7 per-
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centage point increase in the Medicaid insurance rate in non-expansion states due to a “woodwork
effect.” In expansion states, the ACA increased the Medicaid insurance rate by 3.9 percentage points.
Post-ACA Medicaid uptake is 3.13 percentage points higher in expansion states than non-expansion
states for the overall near-elderly population.
Columns 4 through 6 show the same results for individuals with private coverage. Just under
9.2% of 63 and 64 year-olds in non-expansion states had private insurance prior to the ACA. After
ACA implementation, the share of individuals purchasing directly or via the exchange increased
by 4.8 percentage points. In Medicaid expansion states, the fraction purchasing private insurance
increased by 2.65 percentage points on a base of 10%. Post-ACA private coverage uptake is 2.2
percentage points higher in non-expansion states than expansion states.
Medicaid coverage gains in expansion states are concentrated among low-income individuals:
the change in Medicaid coverage due to the ACA is 10 percentage points in these states. Overall, the
ACA increased Medicaid coverage by 7 percentage points among low-income near-elderly individ-
uals, composed mostly of Medicaid gains in expansion states. Gains in coverage through Medicaid
in expansion states exceeded that in non-expansion states by 8.23 percentage points, while coverage
gains through private insurance in non-expansion states exceeded gains in expansion states by 4.53
percentage points.
While there were coverage gains in both expansion and non-expansion states, the sources of
the insurance increase were different. In states that expanded Medicaid, approximately 60% of
the insurance gains (3.9/(3.9+2.65)) can be attributed to Medicaid and the remaining 40% were
through private insurance. For states that did not expand Medicaid, only 14% of insurance gains
(0.75/(0.75+4.82)) are through Medicaid, while 86% are through private insurance.
1.5 Discussion
This paper evaluates the effects of the ACA on insurance rates of the near-elderly population
just prior to entering Medicare. The disparity between insurance rates at the age 65 threshold prior
to the ACA was nearly 8 percent. After the ACA became law, the gap at age 65 decreased by 3.4
percentage points. The ACA narrowed but did not close the insurance disparity; the gap in insurance
prevalence at age 65 declined by 2.61 percentage points in non-Hispanic blacks and 8.7 percentage
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points for other races compared to 2.99 percentage points for whites. However, the mean insurance
rate of near-elderly whites is still substantially higher than that of other races both before and after
the law went into effect. Of the newly insured, nearly half were previously uninsured for three years
or more. Sixty percent of newly insured people in states that expanded Medicaid obtained insurance
through Medicaid, while 86% of individuals in non-expansion states obtained insurance through the
health insurance exchanges.
There are a few limitations to this study. First, while it would be ideal to have monthly or quar-
terly survey data, none of the data sources provides such granularity. This means the variance of
each regression is based on five age clusters. However, the large sample size used in the ACS is suf-
ficient enough to offset concerns about variance. Second, this study would ideally use longitudinal
data, which would allow me to track the near-elderly into Medicare and examine their use habits.
Finally, as discussed in Claxton et al. (2014), the time frame in which these surveys are conducted
leaves open the possibility of differences in estimates between the surveys used in this paper and
any estimates from other literature studying this topic.
This paper raises several questions about the relationship between the ACA and Medicare near
the age of transition. It is known that long term uninsured individuals utilize more services immedi-
ately after gaining insurance, perhaps due to newly-diagnosed conditions (Kaufman et al., 2015) or
pent-up demand. What is still up for debate are the implications for Medicare spending compared to
Medicaid or private market insurance in the long run. There are two possibilities: either individuals
newly insured through the ACA smooth consumption of medical services prior to entering Medicare
then utilize fewer services upon entry into Medicare, or newly insured individuals consume more
services both before and after entering Medicare (ex-post moral hazard). If the former is the case,
a valid argument can be made that reducing the near-elderly uninsurance rate may curb Medicare
spending growth by shifting costs of health care to states through Medicaid or to the insurers on the
exchange. If the latter is the case, the implications are uncertain, as it is possible newly insured are
engaging in ex-post moral hazard or their health status upon gaining insurance is poor, requiring
more care to manage chronic health conditions.
The results of this paper also raise the possibility of Medicaid crowd-out among low-income,
employed 63- and 64-year-olds. The reasons for the shift from ESI to Medicaid are unclear; eli-
gible individuals may learn of their eligibility under new coverage conditions and choose to drop
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the employer plan or employers may decide against offering plans to the group that is newly eligi-
ble for Medicaid. More analysis is necessary to confirm this. However, should this be supported
with further research, the implications of this phenomenon are ambiguous. Because Medicaid cost
sharing is low and benefits are generous, low-income near-elderly enrollees can obtain necessary
health care at a lower out of pocket cost. However, although there is potential for consumption
smoothing across the transition into Medicare, the true costs of care prior to reaching age 65 would
be transferred from employers to states and the federal government.
Finally, an important long term measurable effect of the ACA in general is whether it reduced
morbidity or mortality. Previous large scale government interventions providing health care and
health insurance (Medicare and Medicaid) have resulted in substantial improvements in mortality
(Card et al., 2009; Chay et al., 2010; Goodman-Bacon, 2018), particularly at the outset of those
programs. Future evaluations of the short- and long-term effects on mortality and morbidity on
both Medicaid expansion and private insurance will inform future policy on health care and health
insurance reform.
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1.6 Main Results
1.6.1 Main Figures
Figure 1.1: Probability of Being Insured at Age 65 Cutoff, Before vs After the ACA.
Source: ACS, 2009-2016
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Figure 1.2: Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Having Insurance at the Age 65 Discontinuity
Source: ACS, 2009-2016
This chart shows the year-by-year regression-adjusted RD estimates of the change in coverage
rates for any insurance at the cutoff at age 65. The estimates to the left of the gray reference line
represent years prior to the ACA. The difference in the mean of the insurance gap at the cutoff
before and after the ACA is 3.44 percentage points.
Regression includes state-level dummies, controls for sex, employment status, education level,
race, and marital status. Standard errors are clustered by age.
Figure 1.3: RD Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Age 65 Discontinuity
Source: ACS, 2009-2016
(a) Medicaid (b) Private
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(c) ESI
Figure 1.3: RD Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Age 65 Discontinuity for Low Income Near-Elderly
Individuals (<139% FPL)
Source: ACS, 2009-2016
(a) Medicaid (b) Private
(c) ESI
19
Figure 1.3: RD Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Age 65 Discontinuity for Low Income Near-Elderly
Individuals (139% -400% FPL)
Source: ACS, 2009-2016
(a) Medicaid (b) Private
(c) ESI
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Figure 1.3: RD Estimates by Ethnicity and Education Type
Source:ACS, 2009-2016
Figure 1.4: Fraction of Medicaid vs Private Insurance by Expansion Status
1.6.2 Main Tables
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics, Ages 60-70
(1) (2) (3)
Full Sample Under Age 65 Over Age 65
Panel A: ACS, 2009-2016
Insured 0.930 0.881 0.986
Female 0.525 0.520 0.531
Married 0.647 0.650 0.644
Employed 0.406 0.521 0.279
Race
White Non-Hispanic 0.819 0.810 0.830
Black Non-Hispanic 0.0997 0.105 0.0940
Other 0.0810 0.0851 0.0765
Education Level
Less Than High School 0.133 0.119 0.148
High School Diploma or GED 0.292 0.279 0.305
Some College 0.286 0.300 0.271
College Degree or Higher 0.289 0.301 0.276
Observations 2844857 1459825 1385032
Panel B: BRFSS, 2009-2016
Insured 0.921 0.874 0.978
Female 0.504 0.500 0.508
Married 0.646 0.653 0.638
Employed 0.373 0.478 0.250
Race
White Non-Hispanic 0.806 0.799 0.813
Black Non-Hispanic 0.103 0.107 0.100
Other 0.090 0.093 0.086
Education Level
Less Than High School 0.117 0.109 0.126
High School Diploma or GED 0.279 0.268 0.291
Some College 0.299 0.305 0.292
College Degree Or Higher 0.305 0.317 0.291
Observations 635948 313615 322333
Panel C: NHIS, 2009-2016
Insured 0.926 0.883 0.975
Female 0.525 0.519 0.532
Married 0.665 0.675 0.654
Employed 0.486 0.596 0.366
Race
White Non-Hispanic 0.815 0.804 0.827
Black Non-Hispanic 0.102 0.109 0.0946
Other 0.0826 0.0866 0.0782
Education Level
Less Than High School 0.156 0.142 0.170
High School Diploma or GED 0.251 0.240 0.262
Some College 0.273 0.285 0.260
College Degree or Higher 0.321 0.333 0.308
Observations 74780 39172 35608
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Table 1.2: Estimated Discontinuities at Age 65 Threshold-Other Insurance Types
Medicare ESI Two or More
Full Sample <139% FPL 139%-400%FPL Full Sample <139% FPL 139%-400%FPL Full Sample <139% FPL 139%-400%FPL
2009 0.149 0.154 0.197 -0.390 -0.117 -0.343 0.359 0.261 0.321
(0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0010)
2010 0.165 0.147 0.217 -0.358 -0.0835 -0.320 0.322 0.262 0.303
(0.0030) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0056) (0.0013) (0.0013)
2011 0.180 0.193 0.223 -0.385 -0.0915 -0.369 0.338 0.256 0.300
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0123) (0.0014) (0.0213) (0.0031) (0.0022) (0.0037)
2012 0.187 0.219 0.217 -0.349 -0.101 -0.311 0.304 0.257 0.285
(0.0005) (0.0028) (0.0006) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0023) (0.0059) (0.0030) (0.0013)
2013 0.169 0.191 0.211 -0.368 -0.117 -0.318 0.330 0.242 0.311
(0.0038) (0.0005) (0.0061) (0.0024) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0010) (0.0088)
2014 0.198 0.173 0.231 -0.360 -0.0888 -0.326 0.324 0.234 0.315
(0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0032) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0009)
2015 0.187 0.173 0.219 -0.345 -0.0822 -0.284 0.335 0.255 0.299
(0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0033) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0009)
2016 0.183 0.165 0.221 -0.342 -0.0658 -0.288 0.431 0.335 0.385
(0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0023) (0.0008) (0.0032) (0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0009)
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: ACS 2009-2016
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Table 1.3: Estimated Discontinuities at Age 65 Threshold By Insurance Type
Any Insurance Medicare Medicaid Private Employer Sponsored Two or More
Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate
Age 63-64 Age 63-64 Age 63-64 Age 63-64 Age 63-64 Age 63-64
Full Sample
Post-Age65 0.0901 0.0797 0.0474 0.179 0.0553 -0.0479 0.110 -0.103 0.491 -0.364 0.138 0.342
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 -0.0344 0.0185 -0.0204 -0.0272 0.0257 0.0325
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
By Income Level
<139% FPL
Post-Age65 0.785 0.141 0.104 0.180 0.197 -0.163 0.0925 -0.0759 0.121 -0.0918 0.205 0.252
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 -0.0636 -0.00922 -0.0705 -0.0169 0.0211 0.0253
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
139%-400% FPL
Post-Age65 0.872 0.101 0.0623 0.215 0.0481 -0.0405 0.124 -0.111 0.428 -0.313 0.142 0.300
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.012) (0.005)
PostACA*Post-Age65 -0.0415 0.00652 -0.0264 -0.0445 0.0534 0.0242
(0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003)
By Ethnicity
White NH:
Post-Age65 0.914 0.0732 0.0429 0.180 0.0408 -0.0358 0.119 -0.113 0.521 -0.392 0.132 0.357
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 -0.0299 0.0224 -0.0138 -0.0311 0.0234 0.0329
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
Black NH:
Post-Age65 0.877 0.0849 0.0774 0.160 0.105 -0.0979 0.0557 -0.0530 0.372 -0.246 0.191 0.263
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 -0.0261 -0.00647 -0.0360 -0.0250 0.0420 0.0511
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Other:
Post-Age65 0.813 0.129 0.0516 0.191 0.125 -0.110 0.0919 -0.0683 0.367 -0.222 0.131 0.286
(0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 -0.0869 0.00734 -0.0365 -0.0104 -0.0290 0.0449
(0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
By Ethnicity and Education Level
Whites w/College Degree and Higher:
Post-Age65 0.957 0.0364 0.0189 0.179 0.0173 -0.0136 0.139 -0.131 0.641 -0.485 0.0974 0.401
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 -0.00965 0.0342 -0.000799 -0.0220 0.0174 0.0382
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004)
Blacks w/Less Than HS Diploma
Post-Age65 0.82 0.124 0.116 0.128 0.211 -0.195 0.0392 -0.0315 0.187 -0.0992 0.220 0.288
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 -0.0458 -0.0348 -0.0422 -0.0188 -0.0150 0.118
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004)
Source: ACS, 2009-2016. Insurance types are mutually exclusive. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered by age.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.4: Changes in Medicaid and Private Insurance Uptake by Medicaid Expansion Status
Mutually Exclusive Sources of Insurance
Source: ACS, 2009-2016
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Medicaid Medicaid Medicaid Private Private Private
Non-Expansion Expansion Full Non-Expansion Expansion Full
State State Sample State State Sample
Mean, Age 63-64 0.0344 0.0502 0.0916 0.0995
Post-ACA 0.00746∗∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0482∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0050) (0.0039) (0.0020)
Expanded -0.00365 0.00982
(0.0078) (0.0069)
Post-ACA*Expanded 0.0313∗∗∗ -0.0218∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0043)
College Degree or Higher:
Mean, Age 63-64 0.007 0.0172 0.120 0.122
Post-ACA 0.00265∗∗ 0.0261∗∗ 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0073) (0.0042) (0.0026)
Expanded 0.00187 0.00363
(0.0069) (0.0089)
Post-ACA*Expanded 0.0232∗∗ -0.00986
(0.0073) (0.0050)
Less Than HS Diploma:
Mean, Age 63-64 0.115 0.171 0.0543 0.0539
Post-ACA 0.0122∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0131) (0.0053) (0.0045)
Expanded -0.0260 0.00583
(0.0201) (0.0133)
Post-ACA*Expanded 0.0637∗∗∗ -0.0168∗
(0.0136) (0.0070)
< 139% FPL:
Mean, Age 63-64 0.125 0.199 0.0745 0.0837
Post-ACA 0.0192∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.0558∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗
(0.0047) (0.0114) (0.0055) (0.0038)
Expanded -0.0278 0.0217
(0.0152) (0.0148)
Post-ACA*Expanded 0.0823∗∗∗ -0.0453∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.0066)
139%-400% FPL:
Mean, Age 63-64 0.0249 0.0441 0.0941 0.110
Post-ACA 0.00772∗∗∗ 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.0697∗∗∗ 0.0404∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0031)
Expanded -0.0114 0.00891
(0.0114) (0.0109)
Post-ACA*Expanded 0.0353∗∗∗ -0.0292∗∗∗
(0.0062) (0.0068)
Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include gender, marital status, employment status, education level and race.
I also include state level fixed effects and cluster by state.
Source: ACS 2009-2015
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix A
Supplemental Figures and Tables
Table A1: Private Market Estimated Discontinuities at Age 65 Threshold
>100% & <138% FPL <100% FPL
Non-Expansion State Expansion State Non-Expansion State Expansion State
2009 -0.153 -0.0776 -0.0389 -0.0737
(0.0047) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0017)
2010 -0.101 -0.108 -0.0624 -0.0744
(0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0026)
2011 -0.0437 -0.0508 -0.0562 -0.0476
(0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0004)
2012 -0.0652 -0.0729 -0.0655 -0.0763
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0015)
2013 -0.0457 -0.0870 -0.0663 -0.0645
(0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0034)
2014 -0.104 -0.0587 -0.0732 -0.0490
(0.0072) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0012)
2015 -0.106 -0.115 -0.0539 -0.0653
(0.0019) (0.0030) (0.0068) (0.0025)
2016 -0.137 -0.102 -0.124 -0.0879
(0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0026)
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: ACS 2009-2016
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Table A2: Estimated Discontinuities at Age 65 Threshold for Low Income Adults-ESI and Medicaid
Employer Sponsored Medicaid
Non-Expansion State Expansion State Non-Expansion State Expansion State
<139% FPL
2009 -0.116 -0.124 -0.117 -0.166
(0.0016) (0.0026) (0.0004) (0.0025)
2010 -0.0993 -0.0825 -0.109 -0.169
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0017)
2011 -0.0735 -0.0826 -0.0992 -0.157
(0.0043) (0.0020) (0.0004) (0.0021)
2012 -0.103 -0.0968 -0.117 -0.164
(0.0036) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0012)
2013 -0.112 -0.121 -0.0591 -0.149
(0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0023)
2014 -0.0852 -0.0880 -0.104 -0.235
(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0031)
2015 -0.107 -0.0531 -0.137 -0.244
(0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0012)
2016 -0.0672 -0.0874 -0.186 -0.293
(0.0010) (0.0046) (0.0009) (0.0021)
<100% FPL
2009 -0.120 -0.117 -0.114 -0.199
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0018) (0.0037)
2010 -0.0899 -0.0661 -0.137 -0.201
(0.0016) (0.0044) (0.0022) (0.0036)
2011 -0.0676 -0.0884 -0.137 -0.197
(0.0069) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.0030)
2012 -0.124 -0.121 -0.137 -0.212
(0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0012)
2013 -0.0989 -0.119 -0.0829 -0.158
(0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0043)
2014 -0.0837 -0.102 -0.105 -0.245
(0.0031) (0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0014)
2015 -0.0834 -0.0435 -0.170 -0.247
(0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0010)
2016 -0.0715 -0.101 -0.200 -0.305
(0.0039) (0.0060) (0.0021) (0.0027)
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: ACS 2009-2016
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Figure A1: Probability of Being Insured at Age 65 Cutoff, Before vs After the ACA.
Source: NHIS, 2009-2016
Figure A2: Probability of Being Insured at Age 65 Cutoff, Before vs After the ACA.
Source: BRFSS, 2009-2016
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Figure A3: Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Having Insurance at the Age 65 Discontinuity
Source: NHIS 2009-2016
Figure A4: Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Age 65 Discontinuity-Medicaid
Source: NHIS, 2009-2016
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Figure A5: Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Having Insurance at the Age 65 Discontinuity
Source: BRFSS 2009-2016
Figure A6: Estimates of the Effect of the ACA on Age 65 Discontinuity-Medicaid
Source: NHIS, 2009-2016
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Figure A7: RD Estimates by Ethnicity and Education Type: BRFSS, 2009-2016
Figure A8: RD Estimates by Ethnicity and Education Type
Source:NHIS, 2009-2016
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Table A3: Estimated Discontinuities at Age 65 Due to ACA
Source: NHIS, 2009-2016
Any Insurance Medicare Medicaid Private Employer Sponsored Two or More Other
Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate Mean Estimate
Age 63-64 at Age 65 Age 63-64 at Age 65 Age 63-64 at Age 65 Age 63-64 at Age 65 Age 63-64 at Age 65 Age 63-64 at Age 65 Age 63-64 at Age 65
Full Sample
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.901 -0.0318 0.0618 0.0164 0.0380 -0.00524 0.187 -0.0561 0.376 0.0447 0.135 -0.0418 0.0903 0.0102
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.896 -0.0465 0.0611 0.0726 0.0426 -0.00409 0.209 -0.0476 0.369 0.0591 0.129 -0.111 0.072 -0.0111
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
By Ethnicity
White Non-Hispanic
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.905 -0.0390 0.0557 -0.00189 0.0302 0.0051 0.196 -0.0570 0.391 0.0215 0.133 -0.0346 0.0876 0.0263
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Black Non-Hispanic
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.881 0.000279 0.112 0.151 0.0868 -0.0440 0.133 0.0284 0.280 0.0288 0.163 -0.0277 0.0930 -0.113
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Other
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.867 0.00806 0.0633 0.0457 0.0697 -0.0631 0.159 -0.236 0.326 0.332 0.104 -0.103 0.128 0.00983
(0.006) (0.017) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.007)
By Education Level
Less Than High School Diploma
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.789 0.00592 0.132 0.0629 0.126 0.00691 0.108 -0.0353 0.183 -0.0327 0.158 0.0428 0.0958 0.0348
(0.008) (0.013) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
High School Diploma or GED
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.888 -0.0745 0.0718 -0.0897 0.0355 -0.00449 0.184 -0.0796 0.374 0.156 0.125 -0.0969 0.0839 -0.0471
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001)
Some College
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.909 -0.0140 0.0567 -0.123 0.0253 0.00775 0.197 0.0432 0.376 0.0893 0.150 -0.0345 0.0965 -0.00854
(0.003) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
College Degree or Higher
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.954 -0.00763 0.0302 0.199 0.0135 -0.0276 0.217 -0.113 0.465 -0.0254 0.117 -0.0512 0.0871 0.0557
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
By Ethnicity and Education Level
Whites w/College Degree or Higher
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.956 -0.0188 0.0276 0.190 0.0117 -0.0277 0.220 -0.0942 0.472 -0.0589 0.117 -0.0370 0.0849 0.0736
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Blacks w/Less Than High School Diploma
Post-ACA*Post-Age65 0.824 0.0517 0.172 0.553 0.192 -0.183 0.0915 0.103 0.163 -0.301 0.187 0.0559 0.0566 0.0596
(0.018) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025) (0.030) (0.006)
Source: NHIS, 2009-2016. Standard errors in parentheses and clustered by age.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix B
Tests for Research Design Validity
Test for Parallel Trends
I use pre-ACA trends in insurance rates for those over the age of 65 in an event study format to test
for equality of parallel trends. Counting 2013 as the reference year, I interact treatment dummies
with year dummies, regress the dependent variable (insured) on the treatment*year dummies and a
full set of controls. I then test that coefficients on the treatment*year for variables in pre-treatment
years (2009-2013) are statistically equal to zero.
The coefficients from each data source are graphed in Figures B1, B2, and B3. When testing
the elderly population’s pre-ACA insurance trends for equality using each data source, I find no
evidence the pre-ACA trends for the control group compared to the treatment group are not equal.
Results from all three tests (ACS p-value=0.55, NHIS p-value=0.8685, BRFSS p-value=0.9344)
show that the key assumption of the DD study is satisfied.
Figure B1: Event Study Test for Parallel Trends (p=0.55), ACS 2009-2015
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Figure B2: Event Study Test for Parallel Trends (p=0.9344), BRFSS, 2009-2016
Figure B3: Event Study Test for Parallel Trends (p=0.8685), NHIS 2009-2016)
Manipulation of the Running Variable
I test for manipulation of the running variable by following standard literature (McCrary, 2008)
modified for the embedded difference-in-difference in the research design (Grembi et al., 2012).
For a simple regression discontinuity, I plot the kernel density by running variable (age) to show no
sudden jumps in density at the cutoff age. For a difference-in- regression discontinuity design, the
test for manipulation of the running variable requires showing the difference in densities between
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the control (before ACA) and treatment (after ACA ) groups do not abruptly change at the cutoff
age. I plot the kernel density by age for the control and treatment groups separately in Figures B4
and B4. I then show the smoothness of the difference in control vs treatment group densities by
age in B5 to conclude there is no manipulation of the running variable, satisfying the test for design
validity.
Figure B4: Density Test for Manipulation of the Running Variable
Source: ACS, 2009-2016
(a) Kernel Density by Age 2009-2013 (b) Kernel Density by Age, 2014-2016
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Figure B5: Difference in Kernel Densities by Age, Before and After ACA
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Chapter 2
Understanding Trends in Medicare Spending, 2007-2014
2.1 Introduction
As Medicare shifts towards greater use of value-based payments, identifying factors that drive
spending growth is a pressing question for policymakers and health care organizations. Several new
payment models, including accountable care organizations, incorporate incentives for providers to
stay within spending growth targets. Better understanding the sources of spending growth can
inform budget and policy priorities and provide evidence for evaluating whether spending targets
are reasonable.
An important distinction with policy and clinical implications is whether spending growth trends
reflect changes in the health status of the Medicare population or changes in the relative spending
levels associated with a given health status. For example, spending growth associated with diabetes
can result from increased diabetes prevalence in the Medicare population, increased spending per
beneficiary with diabetes, or an interaction of these factors. By distinguishing between sources
of spending growth, we can better identify the potential for cost-savings opportunities and isolate
the impact of reform efforts. For instance, payment reform efforts targeting treatment efficiency
might hold particular promise for conditions where spending per case factors most prominently;
however, longer-term prevention efforts might be more warranted for conditions where increasing
disease prevalence plays a disproportionate role in shaping spending growth. Previous spending
growth trends suggest that changes in per-beneficiary spending levels outweigh population and dis-
ease prevalence changes in determining the rate of per-capita spending growth (Dunn et al., 2016;
Roehrig & Rousseau, 2011; Starr et al., 2014). However, it is not clear whether those findings still
apply to the most recent years of Medicare spending, which experienced historically low growth
(Buntin & Levine, 2013; Martin et al., 2016; White & Ginsburg, 2012). The Baby Boomer genera-
tion began entering Medicare in 2011, shifting the Medicare population towards a younger average
age. Other beneficiary attributes also have changed over time, including whether Medicare enrollees
have prescription drug coverage and retiree benefits. Declines in smoking rates have improved pop-
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ulation health, but rising levels of obesity suggest that associated diseases may increase in incidence
and prevalence (Flegal et al., 2012; US Burden of Disease Collaborators, 2013). This combination
of factors raises the possibility that changes in the Medicare population, including a shifting preva-
lence of disease, might play a prominent role in recent spending trends.
To inform policymakers and providers about potential factors that should be considered when
setting targets for Medicare spending growth, we analyzed the extent to which changes in per-
beneficiary Medicare spending between 2007-2010 and 2011-2014 reflected shifts in the compo-
sition of the Medicare population or changes in relative spending levels associated with certain
beneficiary-level factors. Our analysis included consideration of several key categories of factors,
including demographics, Medicare coverage characteristics, chronic disease prevalence, and chronic
disease incidence. We also examined how the sources of spending growth varied across major dis-
ease categories.
2.2 Data and Estimation Strategy
2.2.1 Data Sources and Study Population
Using the 2007-2014 Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF), we selected a random 5%
sample of beneficiaries Medicare enrollees age 65 and above. We excluded beneficiaries enrolled
in Medicare Advantage as of July in a given calendar year. For beneficiaries who joined Medicare
after July or died prior to July, we excluded those who had Medicare Advantage in their first or
last month of Medicare benefits, respectively. Our sample size ranged from 1,527,010 to 1,639,724
beneficiaries per year, for a total of 12,599,955 observations.
Our main study outcome measured total Medicare spending per beneficiary, adjusted to 2007
payment rate levels. This outcome included total Medicare Part A and B spending and excluded any
cost-sharing amounts and Part D spending. For comparison, Medicare spending was aggregated
into two time periods: 2007-2010 and 2011-2014. We chose these time periods for two primary
reasons. First, while per-beneficiary Medicare spending has been slowing since the mid-2000s, it
slowed even more during the latter time period. For example, per-beneficiary Part A spending has
declined between 2011 and 2014 (Medicare Trustees Report, 2017). This pattern raises questions
about what factors have changed, even over less than a decade, to account for this decline. Second,
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Part D benefits were available for the entirety of both time periods, which was important in light
of evidence that prescription drug benefits may affect other medical costs (Afendulis et al., 2011;
Buntin & Hayford, 2016; McWilliams et al., 2011; Zhang et al., 2009).
The MBSF provided beneficiary-level annual summaries of Medicare spending for each sector:
inpatient, outpatient hospital services, physician services, Part B drugs, hospice care, skilled nursing
facility care, home health care, dialysis and other Part B services, durable medical equipment, am-
bulatory surgical centers, and medical testing. Based on annual payment rate changes announced in
the Federal Register, we applied category-specific payment adjusters to each spending category for
the years 2008-2014 so that spending amounts would reflect 2007 payment rate levels. We applied
the Consumer Price Index instead of payment rate updates for sectors that account for a minor share
of overall Medicare spending: durable medical equipment, ambulatory surgery centers, and medical
testing. To index payments for Part B drugs, we applied the Producer Price Index for Pharmaceu-
tical preparation manufacturing (PPI Rx). Federal budget cuts to Medicare provider payments took
effect in April 2013 under sequestration, so our adjusted measure inflated spending levels by 1.5%
in 2013 and by 2% in 2014 for all sectors besides Part B and inflated Part B spending levels by
1.275% in 2013 and 1.7% in 2014 due to specific sequestration measures for this sector. We ag-
gregated adjusted spending across all sectors into one measure of overall Medicare spending. By
standardizing spending to 2007 payment rate levels, our results reflect changes in spending growth
that are due to the volume or type of health care services provided rather than changes in price.
To account for how spending changed, we examined several characteristics: demographics,
types of Medicare coverage, prevalence of chronic conditions, and incidence of chronic conditions.
To assess high end-of-life medical spending levels, we also identified decedents. Demographic
factors included a categorical variable for age (65-69, 70-74, 75-79, 80-84, 85+) and indicator
variables for sex and race. Medicare coverage factors included binary variables indicating whether
beneficiaries were new to traditional Medicare, either because their Medicare coverage began or
they switched from Medicare Advantage participation in a given study year. Coverage factors also
included binary indicators to identify beneficiaries with the following benefits: Part A coverage only,
Part D prescription drug coverage, non-Part D prescriptive drug coverage, partial Medicaid benefits
(coverage of Medicare premiums and, for lower-income beneficiaries, Medicare cost-sharing), and
full Medicaid benefits (coverage of Medicare premiums and cost-sharing and other services not
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covered by Medicare such as long-term care).
The MBSF includes indicators for 26 common diseases, which we used as the basis for mea-
suring the prevalence and incidence of chronic conditions (Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse,
2016). These indicators identified whether beneficiaries had diagnosis codes in Medicare Part A
and B claims that were consistent with having a specific condition. The lookback period for these
algorithms ranged from 1-3 years, so even though our earliest study year is 2007, the identification
of some chronic conditions was based on claims dating back as early as 2004. The MBSF also
identified the month that beneficiaries first met the criteria for having a given condition, which we
used as a proxy for chronic condition incidence. We created binary indicators to flag whether ben-
eficiaries had specific incident chronic conditions. For beneficiaries who are new to Medicare or
switching mid-year to fee-for-service Medicare from Medicare Advantage, there is no claims his-
tory to distinguish between incident and pre-existing conditions. Therefore, for these beneficiaries
we did not categorize their chronic conditions as incident with the rest of our study population.
Instead, we created two indicator variables to identify if beneficiaries who were new to Medicare or
switching from Medicare Advantage had any chronic conditions.
2.2.2 Research Design
To understand how these factors contributed to changes in per-beneficiary spending between
2007-2010 and 2011-2014, we conducted an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis with the Oax-
aca Stata package (Blinder, 1973; Jann, 2008; Oaxaca, 1973). We used this approach to determine
how much of per-beneficiary spending growth can be attributed to (1) changes in the characteristics
of the Medicare population, (2) changes in relative spending levels for beneficiaries with a given
characteristic, and (3) any interaction between these two sources. In this context, a factors relative
spending level is its marginal effect on spending, or how much greater (or lower) per-beneficiary
spending would be if an individual had the characteristic in question.
Using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition approach, we decomposed the change in mean per-
beneficiary spending between two time periods, 2007-2010 (the early time period) and 2011-2014
(the late time period). The preceding three equations illustrate our approach. In equation 1, we
predicted mean spending per beneficiary for the years 2007-2010 (spearly) based on a set of vari-
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ables (xearly). All variables were binary indicators that identified beneficiaries demographic char-
acteristics, coverage characteristics, presence of chronic conditions, and incidence of new chronic
conditions. The coefficients (βearly) captured the marginal spending levels associated with each of
these characteristics from 2007-2010.
spearly = βearly ∗ xearly + εearly (2.1)
In equation 2, we repeated this step to estimate mean spending per beneficiary for the years
2011-2014 (splate) based on an identical set of variables (xlate). We estimated a new set of coef-
ficients (βlate), which captured the marginal spending levels associated with these characteristics
from 2011-2014.
splate = βlate ∗ xlate + εlate (2.2)
By comparing the coefficients and the values from these two questions, Equation 3 decomposes the
changes in per-beneficiary spending levels into changes associated with changes in population char-
acteristics, changes in spending levels, and the interaction between these two factors. To estimate
the spending level differences associated with changes in population characteristics, we multiply
our coefficients from the early spending period model (βearly) by the difference in values for each
variable (xlate−xearly). To estimate the spending level differences associated with changes in spend-
ing levels, we multiply the values for each variable from the early period (xearly) by the difference
in estimated coefficients (βlate−βearly). Our model also includes an interaction of these two differ-
ences.
splate− spearly = (xlate− xearly)∗βearly +(βlate−βearly)∗ xearly +(xlate− xearly)∗ (βlate−βearly)
(2.3)
In calculating the amount of spending growth attributable to changes in the Medicare population,
we measured the change in prevalence for all characteristics of interest between 2007-2010 and
2011-2014. For each characteristic, we multiplied its change in prevalence by its initial relative
spending level to determine how much the change in prevalence contributed to spending growth.
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Each characteristics initial relative spending level was determined by a linear regression model that
predicted per-beneficiary spending in the 2007-2010 period based on all characteristics of interest.
Similar logic applied to estimating the amount of spending growth due to changes in relative
spending levels. We estimated two separate linear regressions, one for each time period (2007-2010
and 2011-2014), that predicted per-beneficiary spending based on all characteristics of interest. By
comparing the coefficients for each characteristic between these two models, we measured whether
the relative spending levels associated with each characteristic changed. For each characteristic, we
multiplied its change in relative spending levels by the initial prevalence of that characteristic in
the population during the 2007-2010 period. The differences in the intercept terms between these
two linear regression models can be considered unattributed sources of spending change. For more
details on this approach, please see the Appendix.
For each characteristic we summarized how much of the change in per-beneficiary spending
can be attributed to changes in population, changes in relative spending levels, and an interaction
between these two sources. The presence of an interaction term indicates that a particular character-
istic experienced changes in both its prevalence and relative spending levels between the two time
periods. The size of the interaction term is determined by the size of those two changes multiplied
together. We report more detailed results for individual chronic conditions in two disease categories
with the largest positive and negative contributions to Medicare spending growth.
To analyze whether our results changed based on the choice of the study population, we repeated
our analysis for two different subpopulations. First, we limited the population to beneficiaries who
had Part D coverage. Second, we excluded beneficiaries who were new to Medicare, had died or
switched from MA during the year in order to analyze results for beneficiaries with 12 months of
Medicare participation.
2.3 Results
After adjusting for payment increases, the mean total Medicare spending per beneficiary de-
clined from $7,683 to $7,502 between 2007-2010 and 2011-2014 (Table 2.1). As context to de-
termine the impact of beneficiary traits on spending, we observed multiple differences in demo-
graphics, aspects of Medicare coverage, and prevalence and incidence of chronic conditions (Table
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2.1). The age distribution shifted towards younger beneficiaries, with the proportion of beneficiaries
who are under age 70 increasing from 30% to 33%. The share of beneficiaries with a Part D plan
increased from an average of 44% to 51% between the two time periods, while the percentage of
beneficiaries with other sources of drug coverage declined from an average of 37% to 28%. Cardio-
vascular disease, a common chronic condition, declined in prevalence from 38% to 35% and from
8% to 7% in incidence. In contrast, the prevalence of endocrine and renal conditions increased from
37% to 39% across the two time periods, even though incidence of these conditions remained fairly
constant. When comparing how per-beneficiary spending associated with different characteristics
changed between 2007-2010 and 2011-2014, several trends stand out (Table 2.1). First, adjusted
spending levels declined at least slightly for almost every demographic group and every group with
different kinds of Medicare-related coverage options. Only older beneficiaries had greater spending
levels in the latter time period. For example, adjusted spending levels for beneficiaries age 85 and
above increased from $11,636 to $11,816. Second, spending levels increased for most categories
of chronic conditions. One notable exception was a decline in per-beneficiary spending for ben-
eficiaries with endocrine and renal conditions. Decedents consistently had high spending levels,
averaging $29,203 and $29,242 in annual costs in 2007-2010 and 2011-2014, respectively.
Overall Medicare per-beneficiary spending declined by $180 between the 2007-2010 and 2011-
2014 time periods (Figure 2.1). Declines in relative spending levels for beneficiaries, rather than a
population shift towards beneficiaries with less expensive health care needs, accounts for the ma-
jority of this decline. The decomposition analysis suggests that Medicare per-beneficiary spending
would have declined by $245 based on reduced spending levels if the composition of the Medicare
population had not changed (Table 2.2). In fact, given the compositional changes in the Medicare
population and their disease prevalence, we would have expected Medicare per-beneficiary spending
to increase by $97 (holding payment rates constant) if there had been no change in spending levels.
A modest amount of the decline (-$33) was attributable to the interaction of these two factors (see
Appendix Table C1 for full decomposition results).
A large part of the decline in marginal spending levels was not associated with any particular
characteristic or chronic condition that we measured, which we describe as unattributed changes (-
$115). According to the decomposition approach, this term represents the change in the coefficient
on the constant term for predicting Medicare spending between the two time periods. An alternative
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way to conceptualize this difference is the change in spending levels for the reference population in
our analysis: namely beneficiaries with no chronic conditions and none of the other demographic or
coverage attributes that were included in the decomposition models.
Demographic characteristics were associated with net increased Medicare spending ($40) when
taking into account changes in the population and spending levels (Figure 2.1). Some of this increase
reflects changes in the age distribution of the Medicare population. On average, per-beneficiary
spending is lower for younger individuals than older beneficiaries. However, when we compare
younger and older beneficiaries who are identical in terms of their chronic conditions and other fac-
tors, younger beneficiaries have greater marginal spending levels (Appendix Table C1). When the
younger share of Medicare beneficiaries increased between the two time periods, this population
change was associated with expected increases in spending amounts. Between these two time peri-
ods, there were also sizable increases in marginal spending levels for beneficiaries who were white
($64) or female ($47) (Table 2).
The decomposition analysis suggests that per-beneficiary Medicare spending would have in-
creased by $99 if we consider only the spending changes associated with Medicare-related coverage
attributes (Figure 2.1). Marginal spending levels for beneficiaries with Part D and other forms of
prescription drug coverage increased between these two time periods relative to spending levels for
beneficiaries without any prescription drug coverage (Appendix Table C1). In contrast, marginal
spending levels for beneficiaries with full Medicaid coverage decreased modestly over this time pe-
riod. Changes in spending levels for other attributes of Medicare coverage, such as having only Part
A coverage, did not make a significant contribution to changes in overall per-beneficiary spending.
When the net changes in spending associated with chronic condition prevalence (-$84) and inci-
dence (-$83) are combined, disease-related factors are the largest contributor to the overall spending
decline, totaling -$167 (Figure 2.1, Table 2.2). Even though increases in disease prevalence would
be expected to increase per-beneficiary spending by $125, these population changes were offset
by even larger decreases in marginal spending levels for beneficiaries who have chronic conditions
(-$175). The reverse scenario occurs with disease incidence: decreases in disease incidence were
associated with a modest spending decline (-$85) that was slightly offset by very small increases in
marginal spending levels for beneficiaries with new chronic conditions ($5).
The two prevalent disease categories with the largest spending decreases were cardiovascu-
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lar and endocrine conditions (Figure 2.2). Every cardiovascular condition except atrial fibrillation
declined in prevalence. Furthermore, almost all cardiovascular conditions also had reductions in
relative spending levels, especially ischemic heart disease (-$68). In contrast, heart failure had an
increase in marginal spending levels from the early to the late period. If the prevalence of heart
failure had not declined, this increase would have translated to a $60 increase in overall Medicare
per beneficiary spending.
Among endocrine-related disorders, the findings for chronic kidney disease (CKD) stand out be-
cause of the magnitude of changes in marginal spending levels and spending related to prevalence.
CKD refers to impaired kidney functioning that can range from mild function loss to end-stage
renal disease. A large increase in the proportion of beneficiaries with CKD suggests that overall
per-beneficiary Medicare spending would have increased by $189 in the absence of other changes.
However, this population-related change was offset by large declines in marginal spending levels for
beneficiaries with CKD (-$175), which suggests that the net amount of spending decline associated
with CKD was -$28 per beneficiary after including the interaction between these two effects. In
contrast, spending associated with diabetes decreased because marginal spending levels for bene-
ficiaries with diabetes declined (-$96) but spending associated with diabetes prevalence rates had
small increases ($6).
Some chronic condition categories did see increases in associated per-beneficiary spending (Fig-
ure 2.3). Among cognitive diseases, increased prevalence of depression and increased marginal
spending levels for beneficiaries with Alzheimers disease or dementia contributed $89 and $41,
respectively, to overall increases in per-beneficiary Medicare spending. Spending associated with
skeletal and joint conditions also contributed to spending growth, almost entirely due to increases
in relative spending levels for these conditions, especially for beneficiaries with rheumatoid arthritis
or osteoarthritis (RA/OA). Increases in prevalence and spending levels contributed to a net increase
of $72 in associated spending for RA/OA.
The sensitivity analyses conducted for different segments of the Medicare population consis-
tently demonstrated that a large share of the spending decline was related to changes in relative
spending levels (Appendix Figure C1, Appendix Figure C2). Like our main cohort, changes in
marginal spending levels were mainly associated with spending on chronic conditions or could not
be attributed to a specific characteristic. However, the amount of the spending decline differed
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between populations. Beneficiaries with Part D benefits had larger declines in spending levels,
dropping by $261 from $9,858 to $9,597 in per-beneficiary spending. When the analysis excluded
decedents, new Medicare beneficiaries, and switchers from MA, the remaining beneficiaries had a
small decline in spending levels, decreasing by $78 from $6,992 to $6,914.
2.4 Discussion
After adjusting for changes in Medicare payment rates, we found that mean Medicare per-
beneficiary spending decreased by $180 between 2007-2010 and 2011-2014. This change reflected
large reductions in relative spending levels for Medicare beneficiaries that were partially offset by
greater spending associated with changes in the characteristics of the Medicare population. Key
factors that contributed to the spending decline were lower marginal spending levels for beneficiaries
with chronic conditions and lower spending associated with decreases in disease incidence among
beneficiaries. Notably, a large share of the spending decline could not be attributed to any particular
demographic, coverage, or disease-related characteristic.
We observed significant variation across chronic conditions in how prevalence and spending
levels influenced spending patterns. A combination of declining prevalence and associated spend-
ing levels contributed to lower spending on cardiovascular diseases. In contrast, spending declines
associated with lower spending levels for beneficiaries with endocrine and renal disorders, par-
ticularly CKD, were partially offset by increased spending due to the rising prevalence of CKD.
Per-beneficiary spending associated with cognitive conditions as well as skeletal and joint condi-
tions increased, although the role of changes in composition of the population versus changes in
spending levels differed across conditions.
Like other decompositions of per-capita spending growth, we found that changes in spending
levels, rather than changes in the composition of the population, explained most of the difference
in per-capita spending growth (Dunn et al., 2016; Roehrig & Rousseau, 2011; Starr et al., 2014;
Roehrig & Lake, 2017). Furthermore, our results are supported by recent work demonstrating that
population changes in disease prevalence explain only a small share of total spending growth in
the United States (Dieleman et al., 2017). Most of the previous work on this topic has relied on
relatively small samples from survey data. By using Medicare administrative data, we have a large
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study population that enables us to model the joint effect of multiple factors. By accounting for
payment rate changes, our analysis focuses on spending growth from changes in the volume or type
of health care services provided.
Our results are also distinct in that previous studies have parsed out spending according to
whether medical treatments and visits are for a specific condition. In contrast, we focus on total
spending for a person with a given chronic condition, while controlling for the presence of other
conditions and multiple characteristics. This approach is consistent with the premise that the pres-
ence of a chronic condition, even if not directly treated during a medical encounter, can influence
spending associated with different chronic conditions.
For policymakers seeking to understand which chronic conditions have greater influence on
Medicare spending changes, our disease-specific findings are particularly relevant for targeting fu-
ture payment and delivery reform initiatives. Our findings on spending patterns correspond to na-
tional prevalence and incidence trends, as well as recent changes in health care delivery for some
diseases. The prevalence of cardiovascular disease has declined, along with Medicare hospitaliza-
tions for these conditions and the use of expensive surgical procedures like coronary artery bypass
grafts (Chen et al., 2010, 2011; Epstein et al., 2011; Fang et al., 2014; Likosky et al., 2013; US
Burden of Disease Collaborators, 2013). Greater spending due to increasing prevalence of CKD
among Medicare beneficiaries parallels long-term trends of increased early-stage CKD and end-
stage renal disease among older adults (Coresh et al., 2007)system20172015. Two factors might
have contributed to lower spending levels over time for CKD: a new bundled payment method for
dialysis in 2011 and reduced use of high-cost anemia treatments (Iglehart, 2011; Swaminathan et al.,
2012; Winkelmayer et al., 2014). If beneficiaries with milder cases of CKD were more likely to be
diagnosed in the latter period, that pattern might also explain why spending levels associated with
CKD declined.
Even though there was an overall decline in spending for chronic conditions, the diseases that
had positive spending growth per-beneficiary merit close attention. The increased prevalence of
mental illness, including depression, contributed to national per-capita spending growth between
2000 and 2010 (Dunn et al., 2016), which supports our finding that a greater prevalence of depres-
sion contributed to Medicare spending growth. The increasing spending levels for Alzheimers and
dementia are particularly concerning because health care services covered by Medicare account for
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only a small share of the overall costs for dementia. It is not clear whether long-term care costs,
which are the largest component of overall dementia spending (Hurd et al., 2013), also increased
over this time period. Finally, in light of how orthopedic procedures and subsequent follow-up care
are being targeted for bundled payment reforms, it will be important to follow whether the increases
in spending levels associated with skeletal and joint conditions continue. Although bundled pay-
ments may contain the costs of surgery, spending levels could still increase if a greater proportion
of beneficiaries opt for surgical procedures to treat these conditions (Dummit et al., 2016; Fisher,
2016). Some data suggest that the growing rate of knee replacements began to level off in the
mid-2000s after steady growth for the previous 15 years (Cram et al., 2012).
A large share of the decline in spending levels cannot be attributed to any specific beneficiary
characteristic, which raises questions about the potential influence of other factors that we do not
directly measure, such as policy changes. Over the time period of our study, CMS launched multiple
initiatives to improve health care delivery in traditional Medicare and potentially bend the cost
curve. National financial incentive programs, for example, encouraged multiple providers to adopt
electronic health records and to reduce hospital readmissions. A select group of providers opted to
participate in accountable care organizations and bundled payment initiatives that promoted greater
efficiency in how health services are delivered. Under the Affordable Care Act and sequestration, the
federal government reduced payment rates to hospitals and other providers. Although our analysis
of payment-adjusted spending does not consider the direct effects of these measures, such actions
could have prompted providers to respond with increases or decreases in service volume. In the short
term, these initiatives are premised on the assumption that Medicare can achieve greater efficiency,
especially for beneficiaries with costly conditions. Our analysis is not designed to identify whether
these initiatives have decreased costs, but our findings that relative spending levels for beneficiaries
with chronic conditions has decreased is consistent with the possibility that health care delivery has
changed.
Furthermore, participation in the Medicare Advantage program has dramatically increased over
this time period from 22% of Medicare beneficiaries in 2008 to 31% in 2014 (Jacobson et al., 2016).
There is some evidence that increased Medicare Advantage participation can moderate health care
spending in traditional Medicare through spillover effects on health care delivery patterns (Baicker
et al., 2013; Chernew et al., 2008). On the other hand, there are mixed results about whether health-
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ier Medicare beneficiaries still selectively participate in Medicare Advantage, even after recent risk
adjustment reforms that were intended to encourage enrollment among sicker beneficiaries (Brown
et al., 2014; McWilliams et al., 2012). The net effect of increased Medicare Advantage participation
on spending levels for traditional Medicare beneficiaries is not clear.
Several aspects of our study limit the conclusions that can be drawn from our findings. Disease
identification is based on claims, so we cannot observe beneficiaries who had chronic conditions but
no associated treatment, nor can we observe disease severity. Our results may be sensitive to upcod-
ing the number of diagnoses on Medicare claims if the extent of upcoding changed between our two
comparison periods. If our analysis had included Part D spending, results may have changed for
several conditions that are treated with expensive medications, such as rheumatoid arthritis. We do
not account for several factors that are difficult to measure and could have influenced beneficiaries
spending levels, such as income, assets, and Medicare supplemental coverage other than Medicaid.
Because Medicare Advantage claims are not available to researchers, we could not assess whether
spending decomposition results were similar for Medicare Advantage members. Our analysis does
not evaluate whether changes in Medicare spending affected the quality of care for Medicare ben-
eficiaries. Finally, we examined changes in Medicare spending over a relatively short time period
when there was exceptionally low growth, so our results might not generalize to other time periods.
The success of Medicare payment reforms, at least in the short term, relies upon providers being
able to reduce spending levels for beneficiaries with a given set of health care needs. For policy-
makers and health care organizations who are concerned about the feasibility of reducing health care
spending, these results can be interpreted with some optimism. The magnitude of spending level
declines for beneficiaries with chronic conditions may be an indication that there are opportunities
for health care organizations to provide care more efficiently. However, the extent to which reduced
spending levels are offset by spending growth due to increased prevalence of chronic conditions
suggests that there is an equally important role for policies that promote disease prevention.
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2.5 Main Results
2.5.1 Main Figures
Figure 2.1: Notes: Authors calculations using a 5% sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over
age 65, years 2007-2014. Medicare spending was deflated to 2007 payment rates using sector-specific infor-
mation on annual market basket updates.
Figure 2.2: Notes: Authors calculations using a 5% sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over
age 65, years 2007-2014. Medicare spending was deflated to 2007 payment rates using sector-specific infor-
mation on annual market basket updates. Total Cardio.: Total Cardiovascular; Atrial Fib.: Atrial Fibrillation;
Total Endo.: Total Endocrine.
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Figure 2.3: Notes: Authors calculations using a 5% sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over
age 65, years 2007-2014. Medicare spending was deflated to 2007 payment rates using sector-specific infor-
mation on annual market basket updates. RA/OA: Rheumatoid Arthritis / Osteoarthritis
2.5.2 Main Tables
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Table 2.1: Prevalence of Key Factors in Medicare Population and Associated Adjusted Spending Amount
per Beneficiary, 2007-2010 and 2011-2014
Prevalence of Key
Factors in Medicare Population
Associated Adjusted Spending
Amount per Beneficiary
2007-2010 2011-2014 2007-2010 2011-2014
Annual number of beneficiaries (Mean) 1,535,613 1,614,376
Total Spending Amount 7,682.7 7,502.3
Per-Beneficiary (Unadjusted)
Demographic characteristics (%)
Age 65-69 29.8 32.7 4,536.9 4,395.5
Age 70-74 22.0 22.4 6,748.2 6,738.0
Age 75-79 17.8 16.6 8,573.3 8,567.3
Age 80-84 14.6 12.9 10,175.7 10,187.0
Age 85+ 15.7 15.5 11,636.2 11,816.2
Male 43.4 44.6 7,499.2 7,252.6
Female 56.6 55.4 7,823.7 7,703.0
White 85.7 84.4 7,600.4 7,487.0
Black or other race 14.3 15.6 8,177.4 7,585.0
Decedents (%) 4.6 4.4 29,203.1 29,241.5
Medicare Coverage (%)
New beneficiaries 6.3 7.4 1,578.6 1,535.9
New beneficiaries with chronic condition 2.0 2.2 4,571.2 4,760.0
Switched from MA to FFS 0.4 0.4 8,944.4 9,502.9
MA to FFS with chronic condition 0.2 0.2 14,061.9 14,824.3
Part A Only 8.1 9.5 613.2 550.9
Part D prescription drug coverage 43.6 50.6 9,858.4 9,597.4
Other prescription drug coverage 36.9 27.9 6,804.6 5,707.8
Medicare Only 86.9 87.1 6,833.4 6,668.5
Medicare with Full Medicaid 10.6 10.1 14,055.7 14,021.4
Medicare with Partial Medicaid 2.5 2.8 10,220.8 9,983.1
Any chronic conditions
Cognitive 17.4 18.6 18,414.0 18,699.7
Cardiovascular 37.6 34.6 15,590.4 16,020.7
Pulmonary 12.4 12.4 20,895.7 21,127.4
Cancer 8.2 8.3 16,561.3 17,385.9
Endocrine and Renal 37.0 39.2 14,275.7 13,926.3
Skeletal and Joint 29.6 30.3 13,492.2 13,973.0
Ophthalmic 28.7 25.9 8,381.7 8,470.1
Other 65.3 63.9 11,161.2 11,288.7
Incident chronic conditions
Cognitive 4.3 4.3 25,022.2 25,857.9
Cardiovascular 8.2 7.1 24,878.3 25,909.8
Pulmonary 3.2 2.9 23,509.7 24,057.6
Cancer 1.5 1.4 26,691.5 27,100.1
Endocrine and Renal 7.2 6.9 21,262.2 20,575.8
Skeletal and Joint 5.7 5.2 16,905.1 17,746.7
Ophthalmic 4.9 4.6 8,209.1 8,084.8
Other 11.4 9.8 13,611.8 13,981.0
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Table 2.2: Decomposition of Mean Medicare Per-Beneficiary Spending, 2007-2010 versus 2011-2014
Amount of Spending Growth Associated with Changes($)
Population Changes Changes in RelativeSpending Levels Interaction
Total 96.9** -244.8** -32.5**
Demographics
Age 70-74 -0.1* -18.8** -0.3**
Age 75-79 4.5** -30.6** 2.2**
Age 80-84 19.1** -32.6** 3.9**
Age 85+ 6.5** -33.2** 0.6**
Female 2.3** 46.9** -0.9**
White 7.5** 64.0** -1.0**
Decedents -22.8** -15.6** 0.8**
Medicare Coverage
New beneficiaries 6.1** -1.2 -0.2
New beneficiaries with chronic condition -0.2* -0.5 0.0
Switched from MA to FFS -0.1** 1.0 -0.1
MA to FFS with chronic condition -0.1 0.6 0.0
Part A Only 9.2** -0.6 -0.1
Part D Bene -10.8** 44.9** 7.2**
Non-D Drug Coverage 35.8** 30.0** -7.3**
Partial Medicaid -0.4** -5.3** -0.6**
Full Medicaid -0.4** -8.3** 0.4**
Prevalence of Chronic Conditions
Cognitive 83.8** 42.3** -0.7
Cardiovascular -156.9** -34.0** -0.7
Pulmonary -2.5* -39.1** 2.6**
Cancer 2.4** 5.8* 0.8**
Endocrine and Renal 214.1** -298.5** -47.5**
Skeletal and Joint 2.8* 64.9** 0.2
Ophthalmic -1.7** 27.3** -3.6**
Other -16.5** 56.0** 14.6**
Incidence of Chronic Conditions
Cognitive -6.5** 13.1** -1.2**
Cardiovascular -42.7** 5.4 -1.8**
Pulmonary -5.5** 7.8** -0.9**
Cancer -7.8** -6.9** 0.5**
Endocrine and Renal -4.8** -12.7** 1.2**
Skeletal and Joint -8.6** 7.2** -1.3**
Ophthalmic -1.2** -3.2 0.3
Other -7.6** -6.0* 0.4
Unattributed (Change in intercept) -114.9**
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Appendix C
Supplemental Figures and Tables
Figure C1: Notes: Authors calculations using a 5% sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over
age 65, years 2007-2014. Population limited to beneficiaries with Part D coverage. Medicare spending was
deflated to 2007 payment rates using sector-specific information on annual market basket updates.
Figure C2: Notes: Authors calculations using a 5% sample of fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries over
age 65, years 2007-2014. Population excludes new Medicare beneficiaries and decedents. Medicare spending
was deflated to 2007 payment rates using sector-specific information on annual market basket updates.
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Table C1: Detailed Decomposition of Mean Medicare Per-Beneficiary Spending, 2007-2010 versus 2011-2014
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Demographics
Age 65-69 Ref. Ref. - - -
Age 70-74 -38.6* -123.7** -0.1* -18.8** -0.3**
Age 75-79 -360.8** -532.7** 4.5** -30.6** 2.2**
Age 80-84 -1102.1** -1325.8** 19.1** -32.6** 3.9**
Age 85+ -2434.9** -2645.8** 6.5** -33.2** 0.6**
Female -206.1** -123.1** 2.3** 46.9** -0.9**
White -551.9** -477.2** 7.5** 64.0** -1.0**
Death 9288.7** 8951.4** -22.8** -15.6** 0.8**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Coverage
Medicare Only Ref. Ref. - - -
Partial Medicaid -138.0** -347.6** -0.4** -5.3** -0.6**
Full Medicaid 76.5** -2.1 -0.4** -8.3** 0.4**
MA to FFS 392.5** 645.7** -0.1** 1.0 -0.1
MA to FFS with Incident CC 3007.1** 3308.1** -0.1 0.6 0.0
New Member 592.8** 573.5** 6.1** -1.2 -0.2
New Member with Incident CC -106.9* -134.1** -0.2* -0.5 0.0
Part A Only 637.0** 629.5** 9.2** -0.6 -0.1
No Drug Coverage Ref. Ref. - - -
Part D Coverage -155.5** -52.6** -10.8** 44.9** 7.2**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Non-D Drug Coverage -395.9** -314.7** 35.8** 30.0** -7.3**
Cognitive Prevalence
Alzheimer’s/Dementia 1853.5** 2224.3** -5.1** 40.8** -1.0**
Depression 4490.2** 4505.1** 88.9** 1.4 0.3
Combined 83.8** 42.3** -0.7**
Cognitive Incidence
Alzheimer’s/Dementia New 5884.9** 6601.2** -9.0** 15.8** -1.1**
Depression New 3258.9** 3149.2** 2.5** -2.7 -0.1
Combined -6.5** 13.1** -1.2**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Cardiovascular Prevalence
Acute Myocardial Infarction 17717.7** 17785.5** -12.7** 0.6 0.0
Atrial Fibrillation 3281.5** 3070.5** 9.0** -16.6** -0.6**
Heart Failure 4430.7** 4813.8** -81.7** 60.0** -7.1**
Ischemic Heart Disease 1573.5** 1348.6** -42.4** -68.0** 6.1**
Stroke 7451.0** 7205.4** -29.1** -9.9** 1.0**
Combined -156.9** -34.0** -0.7**
Cardiovascular Incidence
Acute Myocardial Infarction
New
-1379.9** -2477.0** 0.9** -7.4** 0.7**
Atrial Fibrillation New 8095.1** 7791.9** -3.0** -5.0** 0.1**
Heart Failure New 4024.5** 4093.0** -18.2** 1.9 -0.3
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Ischemic Heart Disease New 2589.2** 2776.5** -13.4** 6.0** -1.0**
Stroke New 4085.9** 4685.7** -8.9** 9.9** -1.3**
Combined -42.7** 5.4** -1.8**
Pulmonary Prevalence
Asthma 3108.4** 3457.2** 11.6** 12.5** 1.3**
COPD 5242.7** 4746.2** -14.2** -51.6** 1.3**
Combined -2.5** -39.1** 2.6**
Pulmonary Incidence
Asthma New 1463.5** 1432.6** 0.3** -0.3 0.0
COPD New 2346.4** 2697.4** -5.8** 8.1** -0.9**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Combined -5.5** 7.8** -0.9**
Cancer Prevalence
Breast Cancer 2876.3** 3054.2** 5.7** 4.8** 0.4**
Colorectal Cancer 6268.3** 5720.1** -3.5** -7.3** 0.3**
Endometrial Cancer 5380.5** 6116.3** 3.2** 1.6** 0.4**
Lung Cancer 6834.1** 6138.9** -0.9* -7.2** 0.1*
Prostate Cancer 2357.1** 2774.7** -2.1** 13.8** -0.4**
Combined 2.4** 5.8** 0.8**
Cancer Incidence
Breast Cancer New 5636.9** 5211.7** 0.3 -1.5** 0.0
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Colorectal Cancer New 11600.2** 10862.2** -4.1** -2.2** 0.3**
Endometrial Cancer New 6712.4** 5612.8** 0.9** -0.8** -0.2**
Lung Cancer New 7182.9** 7609.7** -2.4** 1.7** -0.1**
Prostate Cancer New 4332.4** 3400.4** -2.5** -4.2** 0.5**
Combined -7.8** -6.9** 0.5**
Endocrine and Renal Preva-
lence
Chronic Kidney Disease 6649.4** 5184.0** 189.1** -175.3** -41.7**
Diabetes 1213.1** 817.9** 6.2** -95.7** -2.0**
Hypothyroidism 1154.4** 918.7** 18.8** -27.5** -3.8**
Combined 214.1** -298.5** -47.5**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Endocrine and Renal Inci-
dence
Chronic Kidney Disease New 4146.7** 3741.7** 1.4** -13.4** -0.1**
Diabetes New 2051.2** 1651.0** -6.2** -9.9** 1.2**
Hypothyroidism New 442.7** 1007.7** 0.1* 10.6** 0.1*
Combined -4.8** -12.7** 1.2**
Skeletal and Joint Prevalence
Hip Fracture 17753.6** 18417.5** -15.7** 5.8** -0.6**
Osteoporosis 2080.8** 2320.5** -9.2** 16.4** -1.1**
RA/OA 2404.5** 2568.8** 27.7** 42.7** 1.9**
Combined 2.8** 64.9** 0.2**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Skeletal and Joint Incidence
Hip Fracture New 6040.1** 5772.5** -4.0** -1.7 0.2
Osteoporosis New 905.9** 1238.1** -3.5** 6.0** -1.3**
RA/OA New 638.6** 719.5** -1.1** 2.9 -0.1
Combined -8.6** 7.2** -1.3**
Ophthalmic Prevalence
Cataract 90.9** 232.6** -2.4** 29.4** -3.7**
Glaucoma -118.3** -138.5** 0.7** -2.0 0.1
Combined -1.7** 27.3** -3.6**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Ophthalmic Incidence
Cataract New 387.1** 368.7** -0.9** -0.7 0.0
Glaucoma New 234.5** 55.3 -0.3** -2.6* 0.2*
Combined -1.2** -3.2** 0.3**
Other Prevalence
Anemia 6295.9** 6766.0** -22.0** 101.8** -1.6**
Hyperlipidemia -360.8** 121.7** -7.6** 196.9** 10.2**
Prostatic Hyperplasia 2496.5** 3190.4** 16.1** 39.0** 4.5**
Hypertension 1001.0** 471.9** -3.0** -281.7** 1.6**
Combined -16.5** 56.0** 14.6**
Continued on next page
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Table C1 – Continued from previous page
Variable Relative Spending Levels Spending Change due to Interaction
2007-2010 (βearly) 2011-2014 (βlate) Population Changes Relative Spending Level Changes
Other Incidence
Anemia New 1315.1** 1581.9** -7.8** 11.5** -1.6**
Hyperlipidemia New -227.0** -545.3** 1.0** -13.1** 1.4**
Prostatic Hyperplasia New 586.2** 920.9** -0.3** 4.7** -0.2**
Hypertension New 93.3** -131.9** -0.3** -9.1** 0.8**
Combined -7.6** -6.0** 0.4**
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Chapter 3
Diff’rent Votes, Same Strokes: Did the ACA’s Benefits Cross Kentucky’s Political Aisle?
3.1 Introduction
Since passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), there have been many notable gains made
in individual access to health insurance coverage and health care services that may not have been
otherwise feasible without major reform (Antwi et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2017; Courtemanche
C, Marton J, Ukert B, Yelowitz A, Zapata D., 2017; Barbaresco et al., 2015). Despite some of
ACA’s major achievements, including historically low rates of uninsured individuals, there remains
substantial partisan discord among political officials and the public. While hyper-partisanship is not
a new phenomenon, in the current political landscape it has been highly influential in the policy
directions of many states regarding health reform (Jacobs LR, 2013; Olson, 2015; Sommers et al.,
2012). Since the inception of the ACA in 2010, there were dozens of attempts by Republican
lawmakers to repeal the law. Even so, it is unclear how much of this staunch opposition represents
realized action among their constituency.
The extent to which these partisan views permeated into the opinions of the general constituency
is obvious in polls, and the latest polls show those identifying as Democrats tend to view the ACA
favorably given a favorability rating of 63 percent in the July 2016 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2017). Meanwhile, Republicans maintain unfavorable
views of the ACA with 73 percent viewing the law through a negative lens. The strong partisan
opinions about the ACA clash with the numerous documented effects of the law, most notably
being availability of affordable insurance through state Marketplaces or Medicaid.
While the stark levels of optimism and pessimism toward the ACA can be drawn down party
lines, we found that people in Kentucky utilized the benefits of the law in Kentucky regardless of
their political party affiliation. Prior research shows the bulk of the positive effects of Kentucky’s
participation in the reform were concentrated in the poor (Benitez et al., 2017a), and we find rel-
atively uniform gains in coverage and access to care by political identity, with some of our results
suggesting Republican strongholds experienced some in Kentucky benefited equally from the ACA’s
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coverage expansions and Republican (i.e. areas with dense support for Republican presidential can-
didates) leaning counties benefited slightly more than Democratic leaning counties.
3.2 Study Data and Methods
3.2.1 Framework
If behavior is largely dictated by one’s own political orientation, we would observe differen-
tial trends in the outcomes between Democratic and Republican Kentuckians. Democratic-leaning
Kentuckians would expectedly be more receptive to the ACA’s reforms, and thus more likely to par-
ticipate in the coverage expansions including both expanded Medicaid and the exchanges. Because
of this, some would expect Democrats to experience the brunt of the benefits associated with Ken-
tucky’s recent reform because they would be most willing to take up the offer of expanded eligibility
for coverage and coverage assistance than those with prevailing negative views towards the law. We
tests this theory utilizing two distinct data sourcesthe Kentucky Health Issues Poll (KHIP) and the
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).
3.2.2 Data
3.2.2.1 Kentucky Health Issues Poll (KHIP)
The KHIP is an annual survey jointly funded by the Foundation for a Healthy Kentucky, based in
Louisville, KY, and Interact for Health, a health and wellness oriented foundation based in Cincin-
nati, OH. The KHIP samples 1500-1700 adults per year via random digit dialing to landline and
mobile phone. The KHIP resembles the Kaiser Family Foundations Health Tracking Poll and asks
similar questions related to public opinion about health reform among other issues related to the
publics health. Using the 2009-2015 waves of the KHIP, we have four years of pre-expansion and
two years of post-expansion observations. The outcomes contained in the KHIP that are most perti-
nent to our analyses are trends in: 1) insurance coverage (e.g. coverage of any kind, and Medicaid
coverage) [2009-2015], and 2) financial barriers to seeking health care [2009, 2014, 2015].1 Be-
1The key survey items from the KHIP to be used in this analysis include: 1) Political Identity: Generally speaking,
do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or what?; 2) Insurance Coverage: Do you
have any kind of health care coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans such as HMOs, or government plans
such as Medicare or Medicaid?; and 3) Financial Barriers to Care: In the past 12 months, was there a time when you or
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cause the KHIP ask respondents questions about their political identity and ideology, we are able to
compare and contrast trends in coverage and access to care among Republican-leaning Kentuckians
likely to have a distaste for the ACA and Democrats likely to have more positive feelings towards
ACA.2
3.2.2.2 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
To complement our KHIP analyses, we use the restricted BRFSS data for 2011-2015 from
Kentucky’s Cabinet for Health and Family Services. 3These restricted versions of the BRFSS
contain county identifiers, an attribute not common to the public-use version of the BRFSS. We
matched observations to political data from the Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (Leip, 2016),
and we label the county–the smallest geographic unit we could identify with aggregate voting data–
as Republican- or Democratic-leaning based on the margins of victory in favor of Barack Obama
[D] over Mitt Romney [R] in the 2012 U.S. presidential election. In this approach, we hypothesize
if political motivation and candidate selection during the 2012 election was partly motivated by
dynamics in the health care landscape, then it is possible that more Kentucky Republicans swayed
towards the Romney-Ryan [R] ticket as they would have a distaste for the direction of national
health care being taken under then-president Obama [D].
Results are survey-weighted to account for the complex sampling strategies of both the KHIP
and the BRFSS; however, all the survey weights used in the BRFSS regression models receive
additional augmentation to account for variation in voter turnout among registered voters in the
2012 election. This addition to our approach multiplies the BRFSS’ sampling weight by the counties
voter turnout. Under this approach, observations sampled from counties with higher voter turnout
receive more weight in the regression than do persons from counties with lower voter turnouts.
another member of your household needed medical care but did not get it, or delayed getting it because of the cost?
2Please consult the technical appendix to learn more about the strategy used to create the two groups based on political
identity using the KHIP.
3The restricted versions of the BRFSS were necessary because we rely on county-level variation in voting patterns,
and county identifiers are not available for all counties in the public use file obtainable from the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention. The state-restricted versions of the BRFSS include county-of-residence identifiers for more than
90 percent of the observations sampleincluding representation from each of Kentucky’s 120 counties.
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3.2.3 Research Design
Using the KHIP, we use differences-in-differences regression approach to compare trends in
coverage and deterred access because of cost of Republican-leaning Kentuckians against Democratic-
leaning residents. Using the BRFSS, we perform similar regressions but because we cannot link
political ideology within the survey, we use the political leanings of the county. To determine if
there were identifiable differential effects by the political leaning of the county based on the 2012
election, we perform regressions using a post-2014 indicator interacted with the county’s Republi-
can margin of victory from the 2012 presidential election between president Barack Obama [D] and
Mitt Romney [R]. The KHIP allows us to compare the trends of Kentuckians self-identifying their
political affiliation as one of seven categories: 1) Strong Democrat, 2) Not Very Strong Democrat,
3) Independent, but closer to Democrat, 4) Independentcloser to neither, 5) Independent but closer
to Republican, 6) Not very strong Republican, or 7) Strong Republican. For simplicity, we collapse
the categories into three groups1) all Democrats, 2) all Independents, and 3) all Republicans. To
allow for cleaner comparison of the groups based on political identity we omit persons identifying
as political independents because their political beliefs could be more malleable to experiences un-
der the ACA. A benefit in collapsing into the two groups is we will have one group with a distaste
towards the ACA (Republicans and Republican-leaning persons) and those with more tolerable atti-
tudes towards the ACA (Democrats and Democratic-leaning persons). Explicitly, our specification
of interest using the Kentucky Health Issues Poll (KHIP) is:
Yit = β0 +β1Republicani +β2Postt +(RepublicaniPostt)+ γXi +λt + εit (3.1)
Yit references our outcome of interest; Republicani is a dummy variable indicating the individ-
uals self-reported political leaning towards Republican ideology. In this model, the reference cate-
gory includes persons identifying as Democrats. Postt is a dummy variable indicating the observa-
tion was taken following the states full implementation of the health care reform. RepublicaniPostt
is the difference-in-differences term, and β2 is the parameter of interest that would allow us to deter-
mine whether the coverage and access trends among Kentucky Republicans evolved differently than
their non-Republican counterparts. To adjust for individual level variation, in Xi, that may influence
the outcomes, we control for: age, racial/ethnic group, sex, income, marital status, number of chil-
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dren own in the household, employment status, poverty status, and level of education (i.e. <high
school completion, high school diploma/equivalent, some college/technical school, and BA/BS or
more). To account for variation in the outcome due to the timing of the survey, we include year
fixed effects–t .
Using the Kentucky Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (KY-BRFSS) with county
identifiers (i.e. to determine the political leanings of the county), we model the following speci-
fication:
Yict = α0 +α1Postt +ρ(RepublicanLeaningcPostt)+δXi +ζc +σt + εict (3.2)
To maintain consistency across each of the different data sources in our analysis, we included
similar covariates in our approach using the BRFSS. Instead of poverty status, we dummy variables
to control for income. In addition we included county fixed effects, ζc, to control for other important
yet unobservable factors at the county level we anticipate are time invariant but could impact the
levels of the outcomes. Time effects are controlled for by including year fixed-effects, σt . As with
our regressions using the KHIP, Yict represents the outcome being evaluated, and the key parameter
of interest is ρ .
BRFSS files do not contain identifiers that would determine political identity; therefore, we opt
to assess changes in our outcome variables using the political leanings of the county of residence
based on the 2012 presidential election between President Barack Obama [D] and Mitt Romney
[R]. A key limitation of using BRFSS is that we must assume: 1) the distribution of political ide-
ologies represented in the counties true population is reflected in the BRFSS samples (i.e. one’s
political ideology/leanings do not influence one’s willingness to participate in the BRFSS inter-
view), and 2) if we label a county as Republican-leaning, then the observations sampled from the
county should have a large share that would identify as Republican-leaning. Neither assumption
is testable given the structure of the BRFSS; however, to address this limitation we also include
difference-in-difference regressions with categorical representations of the leanings of the county:
1) Democratic leaning [Control group, 21.7 percent of sample]; 2) Republican leaning: 0-23 points
[18.4 percent]; 3) Republican leaning: 23-35 points [22.7 percent]; 4) Republican leaning: 35-50
points [19.3 percent]; and 5) Republican leaning: 50+ points [17.9 percent].
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Yict = η0 +η1Postt +
4
∑
j=1
θ j(PosttRepublicanLeanCat jc )+ ιXi +κc +µt + εict (3.3)
Although using BRFSS forces us to ascribe political leanings of the entire county to individuals
sampled within the county thus creating potential for an ecological fallacy, we reiterate that Ken-
tucky largely tended towards Republican presidential candidates in the past five general elections.
Only 22 percent of the sample reside within a county that leaned Democratic as of the 2012 general
election, and the subgroups among the Republican-leaning counties reflected the natural breaks in
the distribution for Republican margin of victory.
Limitations The KHIP has some inherent limitations in that its small sample size could lead
to problems with statistical inference and identifying valid estimations of the effects on Kentucky
Democrats versus Republicans. Furthermore, because several KHIP items are not asked annually, it
is difficult to track the effects of many of the policy changes across time. There are limitations with
the BRFSS that would preclude us from making the same inferences as we would using the KHIP,
although we argue using both in this setting provides a more comprehensive and even complemen-
tary analysis. We anticipate that the weaknesses of one data source would be partially addressed
by the strengths of the other data source; therefore, observing similar patterns across data sources
should add to the validity of our findings.
Our approach using the BRFSS forces us to ascribe political leanings of the entire county to
individuals sampled within the county, the larger sample sizes allow for testing alternative model
specifications which should allow us to both complement our approach using the KHIP and over-
come its small sample size limitations. Kentucky tended towards Republican presidential candidates
in the past five elections, and our preferred approach allows us to describe the ACA implementation
effects emerging from counties with higher densities of support for the policy positions of Repub-
lican candidates. 4 One argument against either of our approaches could be potential endogeneity
4In the 2012 election, Barack Obama [D] lost in Kentucky counties by an overall margin of 23 percentage points to
Mitt Romney [R], showing the state’s general preferences towards the Republican candidate as a whole. Even if one were
to assume the large uptakes in coverage and access effects were concentrated among those in favor of the ACA’s policies,
there were only four counties (Elliot [+2.5], Fayette [+1.0], Franklin [0.8], and Jefferson [+11.1]) where the president
won with winning margins. In contrast to the narrow wins in four Kentucky counties for President Obama, the average
margin in counties where he lost was -37 points (range: -81 to -5). Jefferson and Fayette counties contain the states two
largest metropolitan centers (Louisville and Lexington); combined with the other two counties that trended in favor of the
president, these four counties make up just under 26 percent of the state’s population of 4.4 million. Alone, Jefferson (17
percent) and Fayette County (7 percent) make up 24 percent of the state’s population.
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in political tilt at the individual- and county-levels because of personal experiences associated with
health reform. For this reason, we are classifying the political lean of the county based on the 2012
election rather than the 2016 election between Donald Trump [R] and Hillary Clinton [D] which
are at presently being investigated and their validity in some districts remains in question 18. Fur-
thermore, we argue the political leanings of counties would be generally slow to change over time
within short periods.5
The larger sample sizes and annual representation for the outcomes of interest in the BRFSS
provide an advantage over the KHIP in many ways despite our inability to identify political leanings
at the individual level. For comparability between the BRFSS and the KHIP, we compare trend shifts
in coverage uptake and financial barriers to seeking health care, but we also investigate the reforms
impact on having a regular source of care, having a regular doctor visit within the past year, and
self-reported health status.
3.3 Results
Focusing on panels A and B in Figure 3.1, we see almost no discernible differences in terms of
starting places for overall uninsured rate and share that had to either delay or even forgo entirely
some medical need because of cost using the KHIP data. For both groups, we observe a down-
ward trend in both outcomes on par with other studies (Benitez et al., 2016, 2017b; Sommers et al.,
2016). Visual inspection suggests coverage patterns and improved access to care were similar for
Republicans and Democrats under reform. Partisan trends in favorability remain virtually parallel
to one another over time, though at different starting places, though reductions in negative attitudes
towards the ACA occurred. In 2012, about 80 percent of Republican-leaning Kentuckians viewed
the ACA negatively before falling to just over 60 percent in 2015. Favoritism towards the ACA
among Democrats was consistently higher than that of Republicans, and peaking in 2014–the first
full year of the ACAs coverage expansions (Figure 3.1, Panels C and D). Using the BRFSS data,
the panels in Figure 3.2 display similar trends for coverage and access. Consistent with the results
5To test our assumption, we regressed the counties’ 2016 Republican margin of victory on the 2012 margin of victory
and the correlation was 0.994(95% confidence interval = 0.937-1.050). Doing the procedure again but regression the
2016 on the 2008 margin of victory, the correlation coefficient was 0.910(95% confidence interval = 0.813-1.008). The
correlation between the 2012 Republican margin of vicory and the 2008 margin was 0.971(95% confidence interval =
0.910-1.032) The regressions were completed using all 120 counties in Kentucky.
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of the KHIP data, Panel A (Figure 3.2) suggests a similar level of decline in the rate of uninsurance
for respondents residing in both Democratic- and Republican-leaning counties in Kentucky post-
expansion. Consistent with Figure 3.2, respondents appear to have benefited similarly in terms of
improved access to care regardless of the political leaning of their county of residence. In Panels
B, C, and D we observe similar trends in cost related barriers to care, having no regular source of
care, and scheduled doctor visits, respectively. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 provide the baseline demographic
information by political leanings from the KHIP and BRFSS samples. To discern if there are any
substantial differences of note, we turn to our regression results in Table 3.5. Focusing on the KHIP
results in Panel A, Republican and Democratic respondents report comparable pre-ACA uninsured
rates. A larger portion of Kentucky Democrats experienced an unmet medical need due to cost, but
the trend shifts along this dimension of access were statistically indistinguishable from one anoth-
ersuggesting neither group had benefited more so than the other. Panel B presents the regression
results using the BRFSS. Pre-ACA, respondents in Democratic-leaning counties had similar levels
of uninsurance as those in Republican-leaning. Respondents in each group also had similar baseline
levels in terms of the access to care measures, with approximately 27 percent having experienced
an unmet medical need due to cost and 17 to 18 percent without a regular source of care. An
exception occurs for last measure, with 63 percent of respondents in Republican-leaning counties
reporting having scheduled a doctor visit with then past year compared to 70 percent for respondents
in Democratic-leaning counties. The objective of this analysis was to determine if, for any of the
outcomes of interest, did those identifying as Republicans experience differential trends compared
to their Democrat counterparts, and we are unable to suggest that Republicans were at all slower to
take-up the ACA’s provisions (i.e. expanded coverage through Medicaid, private health coverage on
the exchange) or that Democrats disproportionately benefited in terms of improved access to care.
On the contrary, we observe that residents of Republican-leaning counties were more likely to ben-
efit from the ACA’s provisions in experiencing fewer unmet medical needs due to cost medical care
(-2.8 pp, n.s), increased access to a regular provider (3.0 pp, p<0.10), and increases in regularly
scheduled doctor visits (7.2 pp, p<0.01). In Table 3.3, we provide additional results allowing for
even more heterogeneity of the effect, and observe the most substantial benefits associated with the
reform were concentrated among counties where the Mitt Romney [R] had winning margins of 50
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points or more.6 There were no meaningful differences in the uptake of health insurance cover-
age or improved ability to afford needed care in the sample of adults eligible for the full scope of
the ACA’s coverage expansions (i.e. Medicaid expansion and the exchange). However, residents
of Republican-leaning counties where Romney [R] won by 50 points or more experienced a 9 pp
(p<0.01) increase in having a regular source of medical care with a 10 pp increase in scheduled
visits to the doctor (See table 4, panel A). In the Medicaid expansion populationspecifically, all
low-income adults with incomes below 138 percent FPL–the coverage uptake was nearly twice as
large by magnitude, and the reductions in delayed or unmet medical needs due to costs were con-
centrated in republican-leaning counties where Romney [R] won by at least a 23 point margin in
2012 (p<0.10).
3.4 Discussion
The results of this study reveal that, though stark differences existed between Republican-
leaning and Democratic-leaning Kentuckians in their attitudes regarding the ACA prior to its im-
plementation, there were no differences in coverage take-up and access to care across political
ideologies. Furthermore, attitudes toward President Obama’s signature health care reform remained
consistent across the study years, with Republican Kentuckians continuing to view the ACA more
negatively than their Democratic counterparts despite being just as likely to benefit from its provi-
sions. These findings suggest that partisan attitudes do not necessarily influence political behavior,
which may be the result of a documented disconnect between the Affordable Care Act and individu-
als’ own experiences with health care reform. According to the results of a nationally representative
survey of 1,000 adults conducted by Sances and Clinton (2017) in February of 2017, 73 percent
of respondents in non-expansion states and 71 percent of respondents in expansion states were not
able to correctly identify whether the ACA had caused Medicaid to expand in their state (Sances &
Clinton, 2017). Nevertheless, this lack of knowledge has not precluded individuals from having an
opinion about the law, nor has it stopped people from reaping its benefits, regardless of ideology.
The results of this study have important political implications given recent legislative efforts to re-
peal the ACA. Sommers and Epstein questioned how Republicans from states that have benefited
6Please consult supplementary findings in the technical appendix.
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from the ACA insurance expansions would approach the decision of repeal (Sommers & Epstein,
2017), and, after failing to gain sufficient support in March 2017, a revised version of the Ameri-
can Health Care Act (AHCA) was narrowly passed by House Republicans two months later, with
all Democrats and 20 Republicans voting against. Of Kentucky’s six representatives, two voted
against (one Democrat and one Republican), while four (Republican) voted in favor of the repeal
bill, which includes steep cuts to Medicaid, despite the positive impact the expansion has had on
the state and limited access to an alternative coverage source for many gaining coverage (Seiber &
Berman, 2017). Gutting the ACA of its core provisions may assert credibility with political allies
and the base of core support in the immediate short run, as indicated by early polls showing that 67
percent of Republicans view the AHCA favorably compared to only 8 percent of Democrats (The
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017). However, the longer-term political effects are less pre-
dictable. Regardless of their sentiments towards Obamacare, many Republican-leaning constituents
in states like Kentucky, where individuals benefitted greatly from the Medicaid expansion but over-
whelmingly supported then presidential candidate Donald Trump [R], are likely lose coverage and
their recently acquired ability to pay for health care without fearing financial burden gained under
the ACA should either the 2015 Senate ACA replacement bill, the 2017 American Health Care Act,
or the 2017 Better Care Reconciliation Act come to pass. Overall, the ACA in its entirety was
credited for reducing the national uninsurance rate by 46 percent between 2010 and 2015, with even
larger gains in the expansion states (Department of Health and Human Services, 2016b). Previ-
ous estimates from the Gallup-Healthways Well-Being Index estimate the number of newly insured
under the ACA through early 2016 to be around 20 million (Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, 2016a)–a large number likely including members across the political spectrum. According
to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 23 million Americans would lose coverage under the
AHCA by 2026 (Congressional Budget Office, 2017). Given that many of those who are likely to
lose coverage under the new legislation include lower-income Americans that rely on Medicaid, it is
conceivable that Kentuckians of all ideologies would be particularly harmed by the AHCA, as over
400,000 people in the state gained coverage as a result of the Medicaid expansion (Congressional
Budget Office, 2017). Should people start losing benefits they only recently procured, it is plausible
that voters could take these frustrations with them to future Congressional and Senate elections. In
order for coverage loss to feed back into political preferences, however, voters must first be able
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to recognize the connection between their personal health care circumstances and the AHCA, the
occurrence of which is not guaranteed. Anecdotal evidence suggests American can have gener-
ally positive views towards the ACAs major coverage provisions (Kliff, 2016), yet still experience
confusion in their views towards the ACA and ”Obamacare.” The ACA is comprised of a set of
incredibly complex reforms that touch upon every aspect of the health care continuum. Second, the
Medicaid expansion was branded separately in each state that participated, with officials of several
right-leaning states intentionally obscuring the link between the Medicaid expansion in their state
and the ACA. Former Kentucky Governor, Steve Beshear [D], admitted to such obfuscation when
he stated that officials in the state wanted to get as far away from Obamacare as we could (Kliff,
2016), which included branding tactics such as naming the state’s federally mandated marketplace
kynect. This limited knowledge, compounded by the highly partisan debate surrounding Obama’s
signature health care reform, mitigated the extent to which the ACA itself influenced the attitudes
and preferences of the public toward it (Sances & Clinton, 2017). Should ACA repeal occur, the
extent that citizens will respond to these losses at the polls depends on voters’ ability to link their
situation to the appropriate culprit which has, unsurprisingly, been a difficult undertaking for the
American public thus far. However, as time progresses, the American public has become more
familiar with the potential for the colloquial termed ”Trumpcare,”and generally indicate negative
views towards negative feelings towards some of the current health care proposals (The Henry J.
Kaiser Family Foundation, 2017).
Our results support, in opposition to partisan rhetoric, that there was no evidence suggesting
those with specific political leanings were negatively affected by the ACA’s major expansion pro-
visions; on the contrary, the largest improvements in access to care may have been among those
who tended to superficially oppose the ACA or as it is colloquially referred’Obamacare.’ Though
our analysis reflects a single state’s experience under ACA, Kentucky provided a case with two
competing factors in this era of hyper-partisanship: the state’s overwhelming support for Republi-
can candidates in five (i.e. 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016) consecutive presidential elections
and the magnitude of the participation in the coverage expansions generated by the Obama admin-
istration’s landmark legislation–the ACA. With the national health care landscape largely focused
on the potential repeal and replacement of the ACA, our results suggest Republican constituencies
are equally at risk from the negative impacts should the ACA be repealed. Our manuscript con-
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tributes to the literature on implications of the rhetoric and partisan division surrounding ACA, and
regardless of differences in public perception towards ’Obamacare,’ there was uptake in coverage,
and likely positive effects in access to care, on both sides of the political aisle. Stated opposition
to the ACA is likely to be in name only as we show no detectable differences in the effects of
the ACA between Democrats and Republicans using two different but complementary approaches.
While partisan rhetoric largely dictates people’s feelings about health care reform spearheaded by
President Obama’s [D] administration, the observed effects appeared to be independent of partisan
rhetoric.
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3.5 Main Results
3.5.1 Main Figures
Figure 3.1: Trends in Views towards ACA, Coverage, and Unmet Medical Needs by Political Orien-
tation in Kentucky. Source: Authors’ own analysis of the Kentucky Health Issues Poll, 2009-2015. Note:
Sample was weighted to reflect the complex sampling design of the survey, and figures represent trends
among Kentucky residents aged 19-64. Percent reporting an unmet medical need because of cost care was
only available for waves 2009, 2014, and 2015 of the Kentucky Health Issues Poll.
Figure 3.2: Trends in Coverage and Access to Care by Political Party Leanings of County of Residence.
Source: Author’s own analysis of the 2011-2015 Kentucky Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Systems
databases. Note: Political leaning of the county of residence was assigned based on the 2012 presidential
candidate with the winning margin of victory. Counties with a positive margin in favor of Barack Obama [D]
were coded as Democratic-leaning; likewise, counties with a positive margin in favor of Mitt Romney [R]
were labeled Republican-leaning.
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3.5.2 Main Tables
Table 3.1: Summary Characteristics of Kentuckians by Political Orientation
Democrat Republican
Outcomes
% Uninsured 26.6% 25.4%
% Unmet Medical Need due to Cost 37.5% 30.8%
% Viewing the ACA Positively 39.0% 11.3%
% Viewing the ACA Negatively 23.7% 53.5%
% Indicating they Understand the ACA 27.2% 27.0%
Demographics
Age 41.8 40.5
%Married 58.0% 58.7%
%Parent 48.1% 54.0%
% Childless Adults 51.8% 46.0%
% White, Non-Hispanic 84.0% 96.5%
% Non-White, Non-Hispanic 13.3% 1.3%
% Hispanic 2.0% 1.3%
% Male 44.5% 52.4%
% Female 55.5% 47.6%
Educational Attainment
% High School Diploma or Less 49.5% 45.6%
% Some College/Technical School 30.9% 31.4%
% BA/BS or Higher 19.7% 22.9%
Income (as Ratio of Federal Poverty Limit)
<100% of Federal Poverty Limit 29.7% 21.2%
100-200% of Federal Poverty Limit 22.2% 16.8%
>200% of Federal Poverty Limit 48.1% 62.0%
Political Ideology
% Liberal 29.2% 8.0%
% Moderate 45.9% 26.1%
% Conservative 24.9% 65.8%
Observations 1984 1700
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Table 3.2: Summary Characteristics by Political Leanings of the County for Kentucky, 2011-2013
Democratic-Leaning Republican-Leaning
% Uninsured 23.3% 23.7%
% Unmet Medical Need due to Cost 27.4% 27.4%
% No Regular Source of Medical Care 17.3% 18.4%
% With Scheduled Dr. Visit in Past Year 70.1% 62.8%
Demographics
Age 46.1 44.7
% Male 38.8% 42.7%
% Female 61.2% 57.3%
% Childless Adult 54.9% 50.0%
% Married 49.7% 61.3%
% Unemployed 10.4% 9.5%
Income as Ratio to Federal Poverty Level (FPL)
% Under 200 Percent FPL 57.7% 62.8%
% Under 138 Percent FPL 38.3% 40.8%
% Under 100 Percent FPL 27.2% 27.6%
% Under 50 Percent FPL 12.6% 11.1%
% Annual Household Income under $25,000 40.3% 39.8%
% Annual Household Income under %15,000 22.1% 18.7%
Race/Ethnicity
% White, Non-Hispanic 74.4% 92.2%
% Black, Non-Hispanic 20.5% 3.3%
% Other, Non-Hispanic 3.9% 2.8%
% Hispanic (Any Race) 1.2% 1.6%
Education Attainment
% <High School 13.2% 19.8%
% High School or Equivalent 31.3% 38.5%
% Some College/Technical School 36.6% 29.4%
% BA/BS or Higher 19.0% 12.3%
Political Leaning of County of Residence
Residing in Democratic Leaning County 100.0% 0.0%
Residing in a Republican Leaning County 0.0% 100.0%
Mitt Romney won County by 10+ Points 0.0% 98.1%
Mitt Romney won County by 20+ Points 0.0% 91.1%
Mitt Romney won County by 50+ Points 0.0% 25.5%
Observations 1,601 7,569
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Table 3.3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effect of Kentuckys ACA Implementation
Pre-2014 Mean 2013 Absolute ChangeIn Outcomes
Effects of Coverage Expansions on
Republicans/Republican Leaning Counties
A. Results from the Kentucky
Health Issues Poll
Uninsured (n=5,048)
Democrats 26.6% -19.0***
Republicans 25.4% -21.4*** -2.4
Unmet Medical Need due to Cost (n=2,169)
Democrats 37.5% -10.9**
Republicans 30.8% -7.1 3.8
Views ACA Positively (n=4,241)
Democrats 39.0% 18.9***
Republicans 11.3% 12.2*** -6.8
Views ACA Negatively (n=4,241)
Democrats 23.7% -10.0**
Republicans 53.5% -5.8 4.2
B. Results from Kentucky Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System
Uninsured
(n=16,307)
Democratic Leaning Counties 23.3% -15.3***
Republican Leaning Counties 23.7% -12.8*** 2.5
Unmet Medical Need due to Cost (n=16,280)
Democratic Leaning Counties 27.4% -10.8***
Republican Leaning Counties 27.4% -8.0*** -2.8
Without a Regular Source of Care (n=16,307)
Democratic Leaning Counties 17.3% -0.3
Republican Leaning Counties 18.4% -2.8 -3.0*
Scheduled Dr. Visit in Past Year (n=16,010)
Democratic Leaning Counties 70.1% -0.6
Republican Leaning Counties 62.8% 6.6*** 7.2***
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Table 3.4: Effects of Expansion on Coverage and Access to Care by Margins of Republican Victory in 2012 Presidential Election
Panel A.
Full Sample [<400% FPL]
Uninsured
Cost-Related
Barriers to Care
Has No Regular
Source of Medical Care
Scheduled Doctor’s Visit
Post 2014 -0.13*** -0.09*** 0.01 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
0-23 Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.07***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
23-35 Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
35-50 Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
50+ Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 -0.05 -0.02 -0.09*** 0.10***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Observations 16,307 16,280 16,275 16,010
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Table 3.5: Effects of Expansion on Coverage and Access to Care by Margins of Republican Victory in 2012 Presidential Election
Panel B.
Medicaid Expansion Population [<138% FPL]
Uninsured
Cost-Related
Barriers to Care
Has No Regular
Source of Medical Care
Scheduled Doctor’s Visit
Post 2014 -0.25*** -0.06 0.01 0.11**
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
0-23 Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.01
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
23-35 Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 0.06 -0.11* -0.10 -0.01
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
35-50 Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 0.01 -0.12* -0.09 0.03
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
50+ Point Republican Margin * Post 2014 -0.01 -0.11* -0.12* 0.03
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 6,470 6,450 6,457 6,323
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Appendix D
Supplemental Figures and Tables
Figure D1: Trends in Comprehension of ACA Provisions and Policies by Political Orientation in Ken-
tucky
Source: Authors own analysis of the Kentucky Health Issues Poll, 2009-2015. Note: Sample was weighted
to reflect the complex sampling design of the survey.
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Figure D2: Time Trends of Political Party Identity and Ideology, 2010-2015.
Source: Authors own analysis of the Kentucky Health Issues Poll, 2009-2015. Note: Sample was weighted
to reflect the complex sampling design of the survey. This graph was provided to show that trends by political
identity and ideology were fairly constant before and after the ACA was fully implemented in Kentucky.
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